Bioproducts and environmental quality: biofuels, greenhouse gases, and water quality by Ren, Xiaolin
 
 
 
 
 
BIOPRODUCTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: BIOFUELS, GREENHOUSE GASES, 
AND WATER QUALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
XIAOLIN REN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Agricultural and Consumer Economics 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
Professor John Braden, Chair 
Assistant Professor Nicholas Brozović 
Professor Don Fullerton 
Professor Madhu Khanna 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Promoting bio-based products is one oft-proposed solution to reduce GHG emissions because the 
feedstocks capture carbon, offsetting at least partially the carbon discharges resulting from use of 
the products. However, several life cycle analyses point out that while biofuels may emit less life 
cycle net carbon emissions than fossil fuels, they may exacerbate other parts of biogeochemical 
cycles, notably nutrient loads in the aquatic environment. In three essays, this dissertation 
explores the tradeoff between GHG emissions and nitrogen leaching associated with biofuel 
production using general equilibrium models. The first essay develops a theoretical general 
equilibrium model to calculate the second-best GHG tax with the existence of a nitrogen 
leaching distortion. The results indicate that the second-best GHG tax could be higher or lower 
than the first-best tax rates depending largely on the elasticity of substitution between fossil fuel 
and biofuel. The second and third essays employ computable general equilibrium models to 
further explore the tradeoff between GHG emissions and nitrogen leaching. The computable 
general equilibrium models also incorporate multiple biofuel pathways, i.e., biofuels made from 
different feedstocks using different processes, to identify the cost-effective combinations of 
biofuel pathways under different policies, and the corresponding economic and environmental 
impacts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Measures to reduce in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) are at the forefront of environmental 
policy debates worldwide. In the US, potential greenhouse gas reductions, together with reduced 
dependence on foreign oil, are fueling interest in ethanol and biodiesel as replacements for 
petroleum-based transportation fuels.  Bio-based transportation fuels are part of an array of bio-
based products proposed as substitutes for traditional fossil fuel commodities, including plastics, 
polymers, paints, solvents, lubricants, specialty chemicals, and electricity production.  
 
While bioproducts comprise a relatively small market compared to petroleum-based products, 
the market is increasing.  Ethanol and biodiesel make up the majority of the bioproduction 
market in the United States, with annual production of approximately 10 billion gallons and 0.7 
million gallons of biodiesel in 2008 reported by Energy Information Administration (EIA 2009). 
More than 20% of the US corn crop is consumed for ethanol production (Sneller and Durante 
2008). Ethanol is predominantly used as oxygenate in gasoline, but the amount used as a 
substitute for gasoline is climbing fast. Biofuels can be made from a variety of feedstocks using a 
number of different processes, i.e., different biofuel pathways, and different biofuel pathways 
will have different effects on global agricultural activities, energy markets, and the environment. 
To determine which biofuels are best, we need to evaluate their economic and environmental 
impacts.  
 
Many studies evaluating the economic and environmental impact of different biofuels have been 
undertaken and most of them are comparative life cycle analyses (e.g., Hill et al. 2006; Kim and 
Dale 2005; and Puppan 2002). They calculate life cycle inventories of costs, and environmental 
and energy flows to and from the environment, for both fossil fuels and their bioproduct 
counterparts.  These analyses reveal advantages and disadvantages of biofuels in comparison to 
one another as well as to fossil fuels. Based on these life cycle studies, biofuels produced using 
different pathways differ in their environmental effects. Although most studies agree that 
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biofuels may emit less life cycle net carbon emissions than fossil fuels1
1) More expensive water treatment 
, they also found out that 
biofuel feedstock production may exacerbate the nutrient loads in the aquatic environment (e.g., 
Franke and Reinhardt 1998; Hill et al. 2006; and Puppan 2002). In the United States, several 
coastal areas suffer from hypoxia due to elevated nutrient loads.  These areas include the 
Chesapeake Bay, Long Island Sound and the Gulf of Mexico (Environmental Protection Agency 
2003). The effects of hypoxia to the watershed include but are not limited to (Environmental 
Protection Agency 2003):  
2) Kill fish and threaten commercial fisheries 
3) Damage ecosystems and wildlife and cause “dead zones”.  
 
For the United States, the most severe problem associated with excessive nutrients is hypoxia in 
the Gulf of Mexico. A report released by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adiminstration 
(Rabalais et al. 1999), concluded that excess nitrogen from the Mississippi River combined with 
stratification of the Gulf’s water was the cause of the hypoxia. Added production of nitrogen-
intensive feedstocks, especially corn, to support increasing use of biofuel would add to the 
problem. Policies that promote a mix of biofuel pathways that efficiently balances both economic 
and environmental impacts will be important in improving energy security and fighting climate 
change without exacerbating the problems of hypoxia.  
 
In the absence of policy corrections for environmental externalities, for the case of biofuel and 
petro-fuel, the product with the least production cost would dominant the market given they are 
close substitutes. However, the externality generated from fossil fuel which is the least-cost 
product, CO2 emissions, currently is the major driver of global warming for the whole world. In 
the US, several policies have been employed to address this externality. Among them are policies 
to encourage or mandate ethanol production as a substitute for gasoline due to the recognition 
that ethanol generates less GHG emissions. However, the increased production of this close 
substitute generates another type of externality, nitrogen leaching, which would exacerbate 
                                                 
1 Some researchers argue that bioethanol may produce more life cycle greenhouse gases (GHG) than gasoline, 
mainly due to the emissions of nitrous oxide emissions from increases in fertilizer use (e.g., Crutzen et al 2007). 
However, most experts believe there are small net reductions of GHG emissions with corn ethanol and larger net 
reductions with sugar cane and cellulosic feedstocks (e.g., Franke and Reinhardt 1998; Hill et al. 2006; Kim et al. 
2004; Niven 2004; and Puppan 2002;). 
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hypoxia problems in the US (Environmental Protection Agency 2003; and Rabalais et al. 1999). 
Thus, policies designed to promote biofuel production and adjust one externality from fuel 
consumption might increase the emission level of another externality. The major objective of this 
dissertation is to examine: 1) theoretical general equilibrium interactions between policies for 
externality-generating products that are also close substitutes, using the biofuel-fossil fuel case as 
an example; and 2) empirical general equilibrium analysis of  public policies as they influence 
multiple ethanol pathways, the mix of fuel consumption, and the corresponding economic and 
environmental effects. 
 
1.2 Methods 
General equilibrium models have no precise definition but they have certain specific features. 
General equilibrium models explicitly represent one or several national economies and account 
for the interactions between sectors and agencies (Bergman 2005). They aim to explain the 
behavior of supply, demand and prices in a whole economy as it responds to changes in public 
policies, consumer tastes, or production technologies. The foundation of general equilibrium 
models consists of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics (Walras 1877). The 
flexible structure of general equilibrium models allows easy incorporation of environmental 
impacts alongside commercial considerations.  
 
Since their first development by Walras (1877), general equilibrium models have shed lights on 
factors and mechanisms that determine relative prices and allocation of resources within market 
economies (Bergman 2005). The empirical manifestation of general equilibrium theory, 
computable general equilibrium models (CGE), have been widely used in sectoral analyses of 
policy changes or exogenous events (e.g., Adelman and Robinson 1982; Alfsen et al. 1996; 
Bovenberg and Goulder 1997; and Shoven and Whalley 1984).  Of particular interest for biofuels, 
CGE applications can assess different production pathways in a single model that captures 
competition and complementarities between those pathways. Impacts of current and potential 
policy instruments on the efficient mix of ethanol feedstocks can be evaluated by comparing the 
equilibrium from counterfactual cases to a benchmark equilibrium.  
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Prior to undertaking empirical examination of biofuel policies and technologies, we first develop 
and analyze a stylized theoretical general equilibrium model of the biofuel economy.  The 
analysis sheds light on the key interactions between biofuel sectors and on the model parameters 
with particular importance for those interactions.  Due to the complexity of the interactions, 
some of the interactions cannot be characterized analytically.  We use numerical methods to gain 
further insight. 
 
1.3 Contributions 
This dissertation applies general equilibrium models to biofuel markets to evaluate the economic 
and environmental impacts of biofuels. As has been pointed out in several life cycle analyses, 
while biofuels may emit less life cycle net carbon emissions than fossil fuels, they may 
exacerbate other biogeochemical imbalances, notably nutrient loads in the aquatic environment. 
Without consideration of the water quality impacts, decisions about energy policies might be 
shortsighted. Yet, none of the CGE applications regarding biofuels to date have considered 
nutrient loads. Among the major nutrients that would cause eutrophication and hypoxia are 
phosphate and nitrate (Rabalais et al. 1999). Phosphate has very low mobility in soil, so its 
leaching rate is low. Soil conservation measures will also reduce phosphorus loads in surface 
water.  These measures are not particular to specific crops, but are important for all annual crops 
that leave soils relatively expose for much of the year.  On the other hand, nitrogen is soluable 
and moves easily in surface or subsurface drainage so it is a more dominant influence than 
phosphorus in estuarine and marine communities (e.g., D’Elia et al. 1986; Harris 1986; and 
Valiela 1984). Not only is it the limiting nutrient in coastal waters, but nitrogen is needed by 
some crops more than others, so cropping patterns dictate its use.  For these reasons, the effects 
of biofuel policies on nitrogen use are of considerable interest.  In addition, none of the prior 
general equilibrium studies of biofuels explicitly incorporates competition among different 
biofuel pathways and the implications for markets and environmental quality. In this dissertation, 
we incorporate nitrogen discharges into the local watershed from biofuels production alongside 
the implications for Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) to evaluate the environmental and economic 
impacts of various biofuel pathways.  
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Using the interaction of fossil fuel and biofuel as an example, this dissertation starts with a 
theoretical general equilibrium model incorporating two environmental externalities which are 
connected from different sources that interact through market demands. This situation is unlike 
previous studies that consider simultaneous environmental externalities from a single externality-
generating activity (e.g., Caplan and Silva 2005; and Peterson 1999). The levels of the two 
externalities are determined not only by their individual production technology but also the 
interaction of their sources in the market. By explicitly modeling the production and market 
interaction of the two sources and using two policy instruments to control the two environmental 
externalities, this theoretical model evaluates how a policy intended to correct one externality 
affects the other and how the second-best policy for one externality is jointly determined by both 
distortions with the assumption that the other externality is not fully corrected. Although the 
market for fossil fuel and biofuel is used as a case study, this model can be applied in similar 
multi-product, multi-externality cases.  
 
Following the theoretical analysis, we develop two computable general equilibrium models 
focusing on petroleum and ethanol market to evaluate how different policies affect the 
competition between these fuels, and between multiple biofuel feedstocks, in a world where 
greenhouse gases and nutrient pollution matter economically. The first of the two models 
artificially constrains trade in order to focus on domestic market interactions. The second model 
adds trade between the US and the rest of the world.  
 
In summary, the contributions of this dissertation are: 
1) Evaluating both analytically and empirically the interaction effects of multiple externalities 
and policies in a multi-product context such as with biofuels;  
2) Assessing environmental and energy policies not only with respect to greenhouse gas 
production, but also for their implications for water quality; and 
3) Incorporating multiple biofuel pathways in a single general equilibrium model. 
 
1.4  Outline 
Chapter 2 formulates and analytically solves a stylized general equilibrium model to evaluate the 
interaction effects of two externality taxes. We assess the effect of one tax on the emissions of 
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the other externality and solve for a second best tax rate, given the existence of the other 
distortion. Chapter 3 develops a closed CGE model of the United States to identify the efficient 
mix of pathways under the influence of current and potential public policies.  We solve the 
model under different policy regimes and analyze the corresponding economic and 
environmental effects. This one-country without trade model focuses on the economy of the 
United States without the extra data requirement and computational burdens introduced by trade 
between countries. Chapter 4 opens up the CGE model to trade with the rest of the world. Again, 
the analysis concentrates on the choice of biofuel pathways and the implications for 
environmental discharges.  
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CHAPTER 2 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INTERACTING EXTERNALITIES 
--- A THEORETICAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
2.1 Introduction 
The theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) states that if one of the Paretian 
conditions cannot be fulfilled, an optimal solution is likely to require departures from all the 
other Paretian conditions. As a corollary, if multiple market failures exist in the economy, 
eliminating one doesn’t necessarily improve welfare. As described in Bennear and Stavins 
(2007), multiple market failures can be jointly ameliorating (correction of one market failure 
ameliorates welfare loss from the other), jointly reinforcing (correction of one market failure 
exacerbates welfare loss from the other), or neutral (correction of one market failure doesn’t 
affect welfare loss from the other). With multiple market failures, the interrelationships can grow 
complex, requiring explicit numerical examination to penetrate the web.   
 
The theory of second best has been extensively studied in the analytical environmental policy 
literature. Most studies examine interactions between an environmental externality and pre-
existing distortions from labor or capital taxes (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder 1996, 1997; 
Fullerton and Metcalf 2001; Oates and Schwab 1988; and Parry 1995, 1997). With varying 
assumptions about policy instruments and revenue recycling measures, their results differ 
substantially. For example, a second-best tax on the externality can be either higher or lower than 
the first-best Pigovian tax. The optimal tax is a function of multiple terms: (1) the Ramsey tax 
which represents the revenue-raising function of an environmental tax, and (2) the Pigouvian 
components that relate to each externality (e.g, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1994; and Samdmo 
1975).  
 
Unlike the literature on externality taxes in the presence of price distortions, very few studies 
consider corrective taxes regarding multiple simultaneous externalities. Caplan and Silva (2005) 
introduced the concept of “correlated externalities” to define multiple pollutants jointly produced 
by a single source that cause differentiated regional and global externalities. Within a multi-stage 
game theory framework, they found that non-cooperative, command-and-control environmental 
policies fail to achieve first-best optimality, but a joint permits mechanism can achieve a Pareto 
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optimum. Such a policy scheme could face many political obstacles, especially market permits 
for a global externality. More typically, although not efficient, different externalities are 
regulated separately or the single source of the multiple externalities is regulated using a single 
instrument. For example, Peterson (1999) evaluated optimal agricultural land pricing policies 
considering pollution from agricultural land as well as non-market environmental benefits, such 
as open space. Thus, one source, land, generates both a public good and a public bad. He found 
the optimal land subsidy to correct the public goods would not equal the net extra-market 
regional values of the land amenities. Parry and Small (2005) evaluated the optimal gasoline tax 
considering traffic accidents, congestion and air pollution as externalities. In a similar spirit, 
Khanna et al. (2008) developed a stylized economic model to evaluate the first-best and second-
best ethanol policies in the presence of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and traffic congestion 
resulting from transportation uses of fuel. In all three of these studies, a simple price-based 
policy instrument was applied to a single product (land, gasoline, or ethanol) to correct the 
corresponding externalities.    
     
This chapter introduces a different way in which externalities arise and, thus, must be analyzed.  
In lieu of correlations arising through a single production process, we are interested in 
externalities that arise from multiple processes embedded within the economy.  We refer to these 
as “connected externalities.” They are connected through technical production processes, market 
relationships, or both. Our scenario generalizes the case of biofuel and fossil fuel production and 
the associated environmental externalities of greenhouse gases (GHG) and nitrogen leaching to 
surface waters. Both fossil fuel and biofuel production processes emit GHGs, but in different 
amounts per unit of output. The biofuel production process emits less carbon, but it also 
discharges nitrogen into the water environment. 2
 
 The two environmental externalities are 
associated with two different products and the two products are substitutes in the market. The 
interaction between the two pollutants acts through the relative demands for the two products.  
                                                 
2 In addition to increasing soluble forms of nitrogen into surface water, fertilizer used in crop production generates 
N2O which is a GHG. Policies designed to reduce nitrogen would affect N2O emissions as well as nitrogen runoff. In 
this paper, the N2O emissions are omitted to simplify the analysis. Further study with a more complex model would 
be required to analyze the effects of a nitrogen policy on total GHG emissions.  
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In reality, policies for the two externalities are formulated one at a time since the two 
externalities affect two totally different environmental issues and are from two distict sources. 
Ideally, the tax rates for the externalities are set as their first-best levels. However, it is not 
always feasible to fully correct the environmental externality. For example, applying the first 
best tax for nitrogen leaching is infeasible. Nitrogen leaching is a non-point source pollutant and 
its accurate measurement is impossible. Although a fertilizer tax, command-and-control policies 
on fertilizer management strategies or generic engineered crops, etc, might be tried to correct this 
externality, many technical, economic or political obstacles stand in the way of efficient 
internalization. Given a suboptimal policy for nitrogen leaching, the optimal tax for GHG will 
depend in part on its effect on nitrogen leaching, which is mediated by the relationships between 
biofuel and fossil fuel.  
 
This chapter develops a theoretical general equilibrium model incorporating two environmental 
externalities resulting from different sources that interact through market demands, in an 
economy with no government revenue requirement. The levels of the two externalities are 
determined not only by their individual production technologies, but also the interaction between 
their sources in the market. Two taxes are used to control the two environmental externalities and 
the resulting revenues are transferred to consumers in lump-sum. One tax is suboptimal, lower 
than the marginal environmental damage of the corresponding externality. By explicitly 
modeling the production and market interaction of the two sources, this paper evaluates:  
1) the effects of a small change in one tax, whether or not the tax rates are optimal, and 
2) the optimal tax for one externality given the existence of a distortion in the other 
externality.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section two describes the basic model. Section three 
describes the method used to solve the system. Section four develops the analytical solutions 
with a small increase of GHG tax and characterizes the optimal GHG tax. Section five offers a 
numerical example to illustrate the nature of the interactions between policies and uses 
sensitivity analysis to determine the most important parameters.  
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2.2 Model Structure 
We continue the fossil fuel/biofuel metaphor in developing our analytical model. Consider an 
economy with n identical individuals who own one resources, a composite factor . The 
individuals receive utility from two goods: a composite commodity X and energy E. Energy E is 
consumers’ energy demand, and it can be achieved by consuming fossil fuel F, biofuel B, or both. 
The final demand ratio of biofuel to fossil fuel can be viewed as the blend percentage of biofuel 
in liquid fuel. We assume this ratio can be any value between zero and one. In this model, energy 
is treated as a production process with inputs of fossil fuel F and biofuel B. All the capital letters 
refer to per-capita amounts.  
 
Production of  is assumed to require the composite factor  and energy E. Fossil fuel F is 
produced from X, and biofuel  is produced from the composite factor . However, during the 
production and consumption processes, both fossil fuel and biofuel generate pollutants. Fossil 
fuel is a “dirty” product with pollutant emission C, representing CO2 emissions. Biofuel is a 
substitute for fossil fuel. Combustion of biofuel also emits C, but the life cycle emissions from 
biofuel are less than those from fossil fuel. The emissions from fossil fuel are measured by the 
net emission compared to biofuel. At the same time, production of biofuel induces nitrogen 
leaching, . In this paper the pollutant is treated as an input in the production process. The 
differential in inputs for F and B allows us to focus not only on the environmental effects but 
also the different input requirements. With the assumption of perfect competition and constant 
returns to scale, the production functions are assumed to be 
  (2.1) 
  (2.2) 
  (2.3) 
  (2.4) 
The total emissions for each pollutant are summations across n identical individuals. Each 
consumer obtains utility from composite commodity , direct consumption of energy EU, and 
total emissions nC and nN:  
  (2.5) 
with  and . 
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In this static model, the overall factor constraint is: 
  (2.6) 
where  is the total fixed endowment of the composite factor in the economy. 
 
For the system, the market clearing conditions are 
  (2.7) 
  (2.8) 
By the choice of XU and EU, each individual maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint 
  (2.9) 
where T is the lump-sum transfer to the consumer of the tax revenue, defined as 
. The unit tax rates for GHG and nitrogen are represented by  and , 
respectively. Market prices for the composite factor of production L and energy E are defined as 
 and PE, respectively. The RHS of equation (2.9) is not chosen by the consumer, but 
endogenous to the economy. In this system, X is defined as numeraire. All the quantities and 
prices are endogenously determined except the tax rates for environmental externalities,  and 
, which are exogenous.   
 
2.3 Solution Strategy 
The system is solved by totally differentiating relevant equations and solving the resulting 
system of differential equations. First, totally differentiating the production functions and 
imposing perfect competition conditions, we have  
  (2.10) 
  (2.11) 
  (2.12) 
  (2.13) 
where a hat (＾) denotes a proportional change, e.g., . Parameter  refers to the 
expenditure share of input  in the total production costs of , mathematically defined as 
. Other  parameters are defined analogously. The detailed definition of each 
parameter is listed in Table 2.1.   
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Totally differentiating the factor constraint yields 
  (2.14) 
where  is the quantity share of L used in the production of X in the total endowment, defined 
as , with  defined similarly.  
 
The market clearing conditions in differentiated forms are written as: 
  (2.15) 
  (2.16) 
where  is the quantity of E used in the production process of X relative to the total quantity of 
E in the market, and it is defined as . All of the  parameters refer to quantity 
shares and are defined analogously.  
 
With perfect competition, the zero profit conditions for the four production sectors can be written 
as  
  
  
  
  
Rearranging and totally differentiating these conditions yields  
  (2.17) 
  (2.18) 
  (2.19) 
  (2.20) 
 
Producers of  can substitute between the factor input and energy, depending on the prices they 
face,  and , according to the elasticity of substitution, , in the production technology. The 
producer’s response to changes in prices can be obtained from the definition of : 
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With no taxes on factor L or energy generally, converting the above equation to the hat form 
yields:  
  (2.21) 
Pollutant emissions are assumed to be inputs in the production process. For fossil fuel production, 
both X, and GHG are required. The elasticity of substitution between the two inputs in fossil fuel 
production is denoted . The definition of  in hat form analogous to equation (2.21), is 
written as 
  (2.22) 
For biofuel feedstock production, nitrogen leaching might be reduced through improved fertilizer 
management strategies, genetic engineering that increases the nutrient conversion efficiency of 
crops, or substitution of cellulosic feedstocks for nutrient-intensive grains. We would expect 
substitutability between nitrogen leaching and capital (part of the composite input L). Several 
studies have estimated a nonzero elasticity of substitution between fertilizer and other inputs in 
corn productions, a major biofuel feedstock in the United States (e.g., Hertel et al. 1996; and 
Thompson et al. 2006). From the definition of the elasticity of substitution (analogous to 
equations (2.21) and (2.22)), we have 
 . (2.23) 
Energy, in this paper, is yielded by a production process with inputs of fossil fuel and biofuel. 
Due to the different energy contents, the need for vehicle modifications when the ratio of biofuel 
(ethanol) to fossil fuel (gasoline) exceeds a certain level, and environmental considerations, we 
assume fossil fuel and biofuel are imperfect substitutes with elasticity of substitution . 
Analogous to equations (2.21), (2.22) and (2.23), we have  
  (2.24) 
   
From the definition of the elasticity of substitution in utility, the relationship between 
consumption changes for  and  is: 
  (2.25) 
By construction, , so an increase in energy price index  will lead to more consumption 
of , i.e., a bigger .  
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Totally differentiating the budget constraint yields: 
   
   
Combining the above two equations, we get  
  (2.26) 
Similar to previous definitions,  refers to the expenditure share of  in the consumer’s total 
income, defined as . And  is defined analogously. The mathematical 
definitions for , , and  are similar to  with different economic definitions. They 
refer to the income shares, rather than the expenditure shares. For example,  is the share of 
income from a GHG tax in the total income. The tax transfer is treated as income to consumer. 
 
The numeraire is X. Thus  and . In this system, we have , , , , , , 
, , , , , , , , , and , 16 variables, and equations (2.10) to (2.26), 17 
equations. Based on Walras’ law, if all markets but one are in equilibrium, the last market must 
also be in equilibrium. Thus one of the market clearing conditions can be dropped. In this study, 
the market clearing condition for energy is dropped, i.e., equation (2.15). This leaves us with 16 
variables and 16 equations. Now we can solve the system for the changes of prices and quantities 
with corresponding changes of  or . Since C and N are modeled symmetrically in the system, 
the results are similar for the two cases with ( , ) and ( , ). Thus only 
the GHG tax case ( , ) is explored in the paper. Corresponding results for the 
nitrogen tax case ( , ) are provided in Appendix A 
 
2.4 Policy Implication 
2.4.1 Effects of GHG Tax 
We start the analysis by introducing a small increase of the GHG tax, , while keeping the 
nitrogen tax constant ( ).  
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Solving the system of equations in the last section, the changes in the prices and quantities of 
interest, induced by the change in the carbon tax rate, are: 
                                                                                                                         (2.27) 
                                                                                                     (2.28) 
                                                                                                               (2.29) 
   (2.30) 
 (2.31) 
 (2.32) 
             (2.33) 
 (2.34) 
where  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All of the parameters, sβ  and sθ , are positive and less than one. Thus D1, D2, A2, A4, A5, and A6 
are clearly positive. The signs for A1 and A3 are also positive as shown in Appendix B. Thus, for 
certain parameters, we may determine their signs, and so their effects on equilibrium quantities 
and prices. The results are summarized in Table 2.2.  
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Our model implies that the price change for each commodity is jointly determined by the price 
change of each of its inputs and the corresponding expenditure share of that input. For example, 
as shown in Equation (2.27), the percentage change of  is simply determined by the 
expenditure share of C in production of F, , times the price change of C, , since the other 
input, X, is a numeraire. A positive  would unambiguously increase  since a positive  
directly increases the production cost of F. Other prices are determined in the same manner 
except the mathematical expressions are more complex because the effects of  on their inputs 
are indirect.  
 
Equation (2.28) shows the solution of . Since its denominator and nominator are both positive, 
 is negative. The price of fossil fuel increases in response to a higher carbon tax. Intuitively, 
we would expect an increase in the fossil fuel price would induce higher biofuel demand and 
thus a higher biofuel price. However, the demand for biofuel also depends on the change in total 
energy demand, for which the sign is ambiguous. We can explain the lower biofuel price due to a 
higher  from the standpoint of input costs. Energy, whose price increases, is an input for X, the 
numeraire. Thus the price of L, the other input of X, has to fall for the producer of X to break 
even. An increase in  reduces the relative price of L but has no effect on the price of nitrogen 
since the nitrogen tax rate is exogenous. Thus, the final price of biofuel has to decline for the 
producer of B to break even with an increase of .  
 
The price of energy depends on the prices of both fossil fuel and biofuel, which change in 
opposite directions. The solution in equation (2.29) indicates that  is positive. Generally, in 
the current U.S. market, we would expect  to have the same sign as  because fossil fuel has 
a much larger market share than biofuel. However, without any assumption about the relative 
values of  and , our result still indicates a positive  with a positive change of . The 
intuition behind this is that the negative change in  is a “feedback effect” to the increase of  
and the increase of  is induced directly by the higher . Due to market adjustments, we 
would expect that  caused by the “feedback effect” is a much smaller than the  directly 
caused by .  So  is positive even though  is negative.  
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The quantity values are much more complicated and difficult to interpret. However, we can get 
some insights if we separate the expressions based on elasticities. The signs for all elasticity 
coefficients with respect to  are listed in the second column in Table 2.2. As expected, a 
positive  yields a negative  and . The coefficients of all of the elasticities for the solutions 
of these two variables are negative, as shown in the second and third rows in Table 2.2. Since we 
assume F and B are substitutes ( ), we would expect an increase in  increases the 
demand for biofuel and the corresponding emissions, N. However, as shown in the fourth and 
fifth rows in Table 2.2, only the coefficient for  is positive and all the rest are negative. Thus, 
without additional assumptions, the effect of  on N is ambiguous.  
 
An increase in  increases the energy price and this causes the producer of  to substitute 
factor  for energy based on their relative prices and the value of . This substitution directly 
reduces total energy demand and thus the equilibrium quantities of  and its associated 
externality C, and  and its associated externality N. Thus the first terms in equations   (2.30) to 
(2.34) are all negative, as shown in the first columns of Table 2.2. The same logic applies to  
except that consumers substitute  for energy. Thus, with a positive change of ,  also has 
negative effects on , C, , N and , as shown in the second columns of Table 2.2. 
 
The elasticity of substitution between F and B, , governs the final “blending ratio” of biofuel 
to fossil fuel in the market. With an increase in ,  increases and  decreases. This change 
in relative prices would shift the demand toward B and away from F. Thus, if  increases, then 
a positive  implies a negative  and a positive . Its effect on total energy demand E is 
ambiguous and would depend on the market share parameter of F and B, .  
  
The possibility to reduce GHG emissions with substitution of X is captured by . Increasing  
directly increases the price of C. As a result, the producer would reduce emissions of C (treated 
as an input in the production process). On the other hand, the elasticity of substitution between  
and N in the biofuel production process, , implies a negative effect on N with an increase in . 
With an increase in ,  would decrease. The producer of B would accordingly shift from N to 
more L.  
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With the elasticities that have definitive signs, an increase in  would reduce production of F 
and emissions of C. For the rest of the variables, including B and N, the changes are ambiguous. 
However, with assumptions about the parameters, some definitive results could show up under 
special cases. Before proceeding with special cases, the optimal GHG tax rate ( ) is defined.  
 
2.4.2 Optimal GHG Tax 
To find the optimal GHG tax rate given a preexisting nitrogen tax, the following Langrangian 
equation needs to be solved: 
  (2.35) 
where . Given , fixed , and exogenous prices for the consumer, 
the total derivative of equation (2.35) with respect to  is written as  
  
where  is the “marginal environmental damage” and the subscript refers to the pollutant (e.g., 
 is the dollar value of disutility for a consumer from a marginal increase of GHG emissions, 
defined as  where  is the marginal utility of income). As defined before,    
and , so both  and  are positive. 
 
The change in consumer utility includes the changes in damages from the environmental 
externalities (the first two terms on the RHS) and the offsetting environmental tax revenues (the 
last two terms). The optimal GHG tax rate is achieved when :   
  (2.36) 
If the nitrogen tax rate, , is set equal to , then  would equal the marginal damage of GHG, 
, which would be the first-best policy. However, this is not the case for our example. More 
realistically, , so  would not be equal to  (the marginal damages).  The restriction 
on the size of  precipitates a second-best policy problem.  
 
To obtain the relationship between the second-best and the first-best tax rate, rewrite equation 
(2.36) to hat form as: 
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  (2.37) 
where N and C are the benchmark emission levels. Since , , , and  all refer to the initial 
levels, and  is exogenously defined,  thus only depends on the ratio between percentage 
changes in nitrogen runoff and GHG emissions. As discussed before, the signs for  and  are 
ambiguous. To get some definitive results, we explore some special cases. 
 
2.4.3 Policy Implications with Special Cases 
Case 1: , then  
When the blend ratio is unconstrained, we have practically perfect substitution between fossil 
fuel, F, and biofuel, B. With almost perfect substitution,  is almost infinite. In each of the 
expressions, equations   (2.30) to (2.34), compared to the term with , the terms with , , 
, and  are numerically very small and accordingly inconsequential to the solution. Then an 
increase in , while keeping  fixed, would definitely reduce F and C, and increase B and N. 
With this case, the two externalities are jointly reinforcing, i.e., correction of one market failure 
exacerbates welfare loss from the other. Then  can be written as  
   
Along with the assumption that , , since  and ,  should be 
less than , the marginal environmental damage. A larger distortion in the nitrogen market 
implies a smaller .  
 
Case 2: , then   
A very small value of  represents the case with very low substitutability between fossil fuel 
and biofuel, such as when the mix ratio of ethanol reaches the “blend wall” and the consumer 
faces a very high cost to switch to alternative vehicles. Then the positive effects of  in the 
corresponding production or emissions are negligible compared to the negative impacts from 
other elasticities of substitutions. The solutions become: 
 (2.38) 
 (2.39) 
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    (2.40) 
 (2.41) 
 (2.42) 
Equations (2.38) to (2.40) indicate that . With no or very low substitution between F 
and B, a reduction in the production of F due to an increase in  would also reduce B at the 
same rate because of the fixed “blending ratio” (the technology to produce E). Thus an increase 
in  would reduce not only C but also N. Then the two externalities are jointly ameliorating, i.e., 
correction of one market failure ameliorates welfare loss from the other. In this case, since both 
 and , the second term on the RHS in equation (2.37) is positive, so  should be 
higher than the marginal environmental damage of GHG emissions. A larger distortion is in the 
nitrogen market implies a larger .  
 
Case 3:  and  
In general, substitution between gasoline and ethanol is neither perfect nor zero since the 
consumers have easy access to flex fuel vehicles that significantly relax the “blend wall”. 
Whether the value of  is large or small corresponds to consumers’ willingness to switch to the 
flex fuel vehicles. With a generalized , one special case is when all other production and 
utility functions have the same elasticity value, i.e., . Then the 
corresponding solutions of interest are:  
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Under this special case, a positive , while keeping  fixed, would reduce F and C. Its effects 
on B and N depend on the relative sizes of  and . If , the positive 
effects of  on nitrogen runoff with an increased  overcome the negative effects of , , 
, and , so an increase in  would increase the nitrogen runoff. Then , like Case 1. 
On the other hand, if , an increase in  reduces nitrogen runoff, so 
, like Case 2.  And, with a knife-edge situation when , then 
. 
 
The above three cases cover only a fraction of the possibilities. In general, the knife-edge value 
of  that defines whether  should be higher or lower than  is in a much more complex 
expression and depends on the coefficients and the values of all of the elasticities. In the 
following section, plausible values are applied to the parameters to explore the likely size of the 
effects of a small change in  on the economic equilibrium and the optimal value of . 
 
2.5 Numerical Analysis 
2.5.1 Parameter Impacts 
The numerical analysis is based on US data for 2004. At that time, the major biofuel was corn 
ethanol, so we use data for gasoline and corn ethanol in this analysis. Our model is represented in 
the share forms, including the expenditure shares in production and consumption and the 
quantity shares in total demand. These values are calculated from a Social Accounting Matrix 
based on Global Trade and Analysis Program (GTAP) version 7.0 (Narayanan and Walmsley 
2008).  
 
Production data for the numeraire X, petrofuel F, and the factor costs for gasoline production are 
directly from GTAP 7.0 (Narayanan and Walmsley 2008). The numeraire  is the combination 
of all commodities produced apart from gasoline-related products. Factor inputs for ethanol 
production are from the GTAP_BIO developed by Taheripour et al. (2007). The environmental 
inputs (both GHG emissions and nitrogen leaching) for gasoline and corn ethanol are from a 
recent life cycle analysis (Khanna et al. 2009) which concludes that corn ethanol could reduce 
GHG emissions by 30% compared to gasoline. The benchmark GHG tax of $24.9/tone of CO2 
 22 
equivalent is based on available carbon trading prices in European and East Asian markets 
(World Bank 2005)3 and then transformed into a 2004 value. No nitrogen externality market or 
tax exists in the United States. Based on a 2002 case study in the Long Island Sound Watershed 
done by EPA, the benchmark nitrogen permit cost is set at $1.73 per pound (USEPA 2002)4
 
. 
With these major data and related conversion factors, the required parameters can be calculated 
and are shown in Table 2.1. 
The elasticity values are the most difficult to assign. Many studies have estimated elasticity of 
substitution values between different commodities or inputs in production processes. However, 
due to the extensive aggregation of sectors in our model, suitable elasticity values are not readily 
available in the literature. Instead of making assumptions about those values, the coefficients for 
these parameters in the model solutions are calculated and, based on those coefficients, the most 
important and sensitive elasticity values are determined. With the benchmark values documented 
in Table 2.1, the coefficients for the elasticities for each variable are listed in Table 2.3. Each cell 
shows the coefficient for each elasticity (indicated by each column) in the system solution for 
each variable (indicated by each row) with a shock in . A higher absolute value of the 
coefficient means a higher impact of this elasticity on that variable.   
 
In Table 2.3, among all the coefficients for variable  shown in the third row, the coefficient of 
 (column 5), -0.9350, departs from zero the most. This indicates that  has the biggest 
impacts on C because  directly increases the GHG price and  allows the producer of F to 
shift away from C. The changes in biofuel production,  (row 4), and nitrogen leaching,  (row 
5), are affected the most by  (column 4). As  changes, PF changes correspondingly. The 
price change of fossil fuel causes a demand shift between F and B, which is governed by . 
With the shock of , all the effects of other eleasticites on  and  are relatively indirect 
compared to the effect of . In terms of the change in total consumption of energy, ,  has 
the biggest impact among all elasticity values although none of them are very big. Among all the 
elasticity values, , the elasticity of substitution between factor L and N, has the lowest impact 
                                                 
3 The United State has no federal level GHG tax. Although a gasoline tax could correct the GHG externality, the tax 
burden on GHG emissions from the US gasoline tax is less than the value used in this numerical example.  
4 This nitrogen tax applies directly to the nitrogen leaching. It could be a burden to farmers but it might be an 
effective way to control the hypoxia problem. 
 23 
on all the variables of concern because  affects the price of L only remotely and has no impact 
on nitrogen price.      
 
2.5.2 Policy Impact 
In this section, we first discuss plausible elasticity values. Based on those values, we calculate 
the impacts of a change in  on all of the variables and compute  under the preexisting 
distortion in the nitrogen market.  
 
In the production of biofuel,  defines the elasticity of substitution between factor L and 
nitrogen leaching. No existing literature documents the substitutability between nitrogen runoff 
and other factors. However, nitrogen runoff is directly related to fertilizer usage in feedstock 
production. Thompson et al. (2006) estimate that the elasticity of substitution between fertilizer 
and other factors is nearly unity in U.S. corn production. Yasar and Uzunoz (2006) estimate the 
elasticity of substitution between fertilizer and other inputs is between 0.74 and 0.86 in sugar 
beet production in Turkey. In our model, ethanol producers can switch feedstocks so we would 
expect an even higher elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. As indicated in Table 2.3, 
the effects of  on the system solutions are fairly low, so the result wouldn’t be sensitive to its 
value. Thus, in this example, the Cobb-Douglas functional form is assumed for biofuel 
production, i.e., .  
 
The elasticity of substitution between GHG and X in the production of fossil fuel, , can be 
fairly low. Most studies generally assume that GHG emissions are proportional to fossil fuel 
consumption. However, as more fuel-efficient technology/vehicles and carbon abatement 
technologies are developed, the substitution between X and GHG emissions becomes easier and 
we would expect a positive value of  in this study. Since  has the biggest impact on GHG 
emissions, the value of  is very important. A small positive value of , 0.1, is assumed in the 
numerical example, and then sensitivity analysis is conducted on this value.  
 
The value for the elasticity of substitution between energy and factor L in the production process 
of X, , is adopted from the value between capital and energy in the capital-energy composite 
in the GTAP_E model (Burniaux and Truong 2002). For elasticities of substitution between 
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fossil fuel and biofuel, few studies have estimated  due to inadequate data. In a modified 
GTAP_E model application by Birur et al. (2008), the elasticity of substitution between 
petroleum energy and biofuel for the US is defined as 3.75. With this value, they are able to 
reproduce the biofuel production in accordance with the historical evidence between 2001 and 
2006 with a reasonable precision. We use the same value in this model.  
 
Concerning the elasticity of substitution between X and energy for the consumer, , generally, 
transportation energy demand is fairly inelastic. Two meta-analysis (Espey 1996; and Goodwin 
et al. 2004) found that the average price-elasticity of demand for gasoline is around -0.25 in the 
short run. Based on the consumption ratio of energy, the elasticity of substitution between energy 
and other commodities is less than 0.2. A more recent study estimated the price elasticities of 
gasoline demand for two periods of time, ranging from -0.034 to -0.077 during 2001 to 2006, 
versus -0.21 to -0.34 for 1975 to 1980 (Hughes, et al. 2007), and concluded that demand for 
gasoline has become less elastic over time. We use a value of 0.2 for . Although the 
coefficients of  for all the variables shown in Table 2.3 are not so small that they can be 
ignored, given the fact that the expected value of  is generally fairly low, the effects of  on 
the variables of concern should be relatively small comparing to other parameters. Thus even 
though value of  is uncertain, sensitivity analysis is not essential. The elasticity values in the 
numerical example are summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
With the assigned parameter values, the effects of a small change (1% increase) in  are listed 
in Table 2.4. As expected, a positive increase in  would reduces F, C, and E and increase B, 
and N. The percentage increase in N is about two times greater than the percentage reduction in 
C.  
 
To evaluate the optimal GHG tax, , the marginal damage of both GHG emissions and nitrogen 
leaching are needed. Both are very difficult to estimate. In this paper, only a specific value of  
is assumed. The optimal GHG tax is then presented as a function of the marginal damage from 
GHG emissions, , and shows how much the second-best policy should differ from the first-
best.  
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In a survey of environmental damage estimates, Smith (1992) suggests that the economic 
damages of nitrogen leaching to the water system probably lie within a range of 0.27% to 
18.24% of total crop value. Abrahams and Shortle (2004) use 10% of total crop value in their 
study, which is about the mid-point of the range reported by Smith. In our model, the crop sector 
is not explicitly modeled. With the GTAP data, the assumption that the environmental damage of 
nitrogen runoff is about 10% of total crop value implies that  is approximately $5.70/lb. 
Accordingly, the optimal GHG tax ($/ton) is: 
 
This result indicates that the optimal GHG tax would be $12/ton equivalent of CO2 less than the 
marginal damage of GHG emissions given the benchmark values. If the nitrogen tax is less than 
the benchmark value of $1.73/lb, or if  is higher than $5.70/lb, the optimal GHG tax, , 
would be even further below the marginal damage of GHG emissions.  
 
2.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
As shown in Table 2.3, the values of  and  are fairly important to the changes of 
environmental emissions which are our major concerns. In this section, ranges of values for these 
two parameters are tested to see the sensitivity of our results to these two parameters.  
 
Ethanol and gasoline are highly substitutable commodities, and we would expect an elasticity of 
substitution greater than unity. In the numerical example, the value for  is set to 3.75, as in 
Birur et al. (2008). In the sensitivity analysis, the alternative values tested range from 0 to 5 to 
represent all possible cases discussed before. The upper value represents nearly perfect 
substitution. For , most studies generally assume the GHG emissions are proportional to fossil 
energy consumption. However, with new technology for carbon abatement, the possibility of a 
positive  should not be neglected. Since we would expect a relatively low substitution level, a 
range of  from 0 to 0.5 is tested. Table 2.5a shows the percentage change of production levels 
with a 1% increase of  with different values of , and Table 2.5b shows the optimal GHG tax. 
Table 2.6 documents the corresponding results with different .   
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Although other variables are not sensitive to the different values of  as shown in Table 2.5a, 
GHG emissions respond significantly to it. Table 2.5b indicates that  is also very sensitive to 
the value of , especially when  is relatively low. Compare the values in the second column 
( ) and the third column (  in both Table 2.5a and Table 2.5b. If  is 0, a 1% 
increase of  reduces GHG emissions by 0.03%, and  is $55/ton lower than the marginal 
damages of GHG emissions ( ). However, if  is 0.1, then a 1% increase of  
would reduce GHG emission by 0.12%, and  should be $12/ton lower than the marginal 
damages ( ). Even higher values of  mean more reduction of GHG emissions 
with an increase in , and  is closer to its marginal damage. In another words, if the estimated 
value of  is less than the true value, the effects of  on GHG emissions would be 
underestimated, and the calculated  would be less than optimal. The major concern regarding 
 is that if  is low, the optimal GHG tax is very sensitive to its value. A different of 0.1 in the 
value of , from its baseline of 0.1, could result in more than $40/ton difference in optimal 
GHG tax. 
 
Concerning , none of the variables are as sensitive to  as were GHG emissions to the size of 
. However, almost all outputs are responsive to  to some extent. Among all the output 
values, B and N are the two most sensitive to the values of  and their signs change from 
negative to positive as  increases, as Table 2.6a implies. With a small , i.e., low substitution 
between F and B, a positive change in  would decrease B and N, as well as F and C. 
Correspondingly, the optimal  would be greater than the first best tax. With a greater , an 
increase in  would increase B and N. With a greater value of , a specific change in  would 
yield more nitrogen leaching. If F and B are close substitutes, optimal  would be smaller than 
the first best tax. A higher  results in a lower  but the effect is limited. If the estimated value 
of  is lower than the true value, nitrogen leaching would be underestimated and the calculated 
 would be higher than the optimal value.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper develops a general equilibrium model to address policy issues surrounding a special 
case of multiple externalities. Unlike previous studies, this paper incorporates two environmental 
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externalities generated by different sources that also produce substitute goods. Two taxes are 
available to control the two externalities. Since the two externalites are connected through the 
fact that their sources are substitutes in the market, the two taxes interact. Emissions of both 
externalities are jointly determined by the two taxes.  The direction of the effects of one tax on 
the emissions of the other externality is analytically ambiguous.   
 
Using a general equilibrium model, we examine the second-best taxes in the presence of 
connected externalities. The individually-first-best policy scheme sets each tax equal to its 
marginal environmental damage. However, the first-best policy may not be feasible, as seems 
likely for nitrogen leaching. Given a suboptimal tax for one externality, the optimal tax for the 
other externality depends on the distortion arising from the other externality and tax. Our model 
results indicate that, with the existence of another closely correlated environmental externality, 
the second-best tax could be lower or higher than the first-best tax, depending on the nature of 
the distortion in the other externality and the interactions between the final goods. Only in the 
knife-edge case is the second-best tax rate equal to the first-best rate (marginal environmental 
damage).  
 
Because of ambiguity in the analytical results, we develop a numerical general equilibrium 
model to explore plausible empirical relationships between fossil fuels and biofuels where 
greenhouse gases and nitrogen pollution are the externalities of concern.  Our numerical results 
confirm that a GHG tax would increase nitrogen leaching with the assumption that gasoline and 
ethanol are close substitutes. Our analytical solutions suggest that under certain circumstances, 
the optimal GHG tax could be higher than the marginal damage of GHG emissions. However, if 
the benchmark nitrogen tax is lower than its marginal environmental damage, and other 
parameters are set at plausible levels, then the optimal GHG tax is lower, and could be much 
lower than the marginal environmental damage of GHG. 
  
In our model, the emission levels of the two externalities are not affected solely by their 
individual production processes. The market interaction between the final goods also plays an 
important role in determining the emission levels. Our numerical example illustrates the relative 
importance of the technical production parameters relative to the market interaction. If  
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increases, the technical parameter associated with production of F, , has a significant impact 
on C but a small impact on N. On the other hand, the technical parameter associated with 
production of B, , has a very small impact on both externalities, because  governs the 
substitution between L and N in production of B based on their relative price changes, and the 
change in  has only a small impact on PL and no impact on  at all. Thus with a change in , 
the effect of the technical parameter of production B to the system is minimal. The elasticity of 
substitution between F and B, , partly represents the market interaction between F and B. It is 
the most important parameter in determining the level of N with an increase in .  
 
Based on the sensitivity analyses, considering the impact of taxes on the externalities, for each 
production process, the technical production parameter plays the most important role in 
determining the emission level of the corresponding externality, and the parameter related to 
market interactions is the most important to the determine the emission level of the other 
externality. Since the second-best policies are jointly determined by both emission levels, 
parameters affecting either or both emission levels would matter to the policy design process. 
The second-best tax rate for one externality is most sensitive to the technical parameter in the 
production process associated with that externality, and the parameter that determines the 
substitution levels between the two final goods.    
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Tables 
Table 2.1 Major Parameter Definitions and Baseline Values 
Parameter Definition Baseline value 
 Expenditure share of L in X production, =   98% 
 Expenditure share of fuel in X production, =  2% 
 Expenditure Share of gasoline in total fuel consumption, =  94% 
 Expenditure Share of ethanol in total fuel consumption, =  6% 
 Expenditure share of X in gasoline production, =  93% 
 Expenditure share of emissions cost in gasoline production, =  7% 
 Expenditure share of L in ethanol production, =  89% 
 Expenditure share of emissions cost in ethanol production, =  11% 
 Share of L usage in X production in total endowment, =  99% 
 Share of L usage in B production in total endowment, =  1% 
 Expenditure share of X in consumer’s consumption =  98% 
 Expenditure share of E in consumer’s consumption =  2% 
 Income share of L in total income =  99.7% 
 Income share of C in total income =  0.2% 
 GHG tax rate ($/tone) 24.9 
 Nitrogen tax rate ($/lb) 1.73 
 Elasticity of substitution between inputs in X production  0.1 
 Elasticity of substitution between inputs in B production 1 
 Elasticity of substitution between inputs in F production 0.1 
 Elasticity of substitution between fossil fuel and biofuel 3.75 
 Elasticity of substitution between X and E for consumers 0.2 
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Table 2.2 Signs of Elasticity Coefficients for Different Variables Given Positive * 
Variables      
 − − − − − 
 − − − − − 
 − − + − − 
 − − + − − 
 − − Ambiguous − − 
 + 
 − 
 + 
 
*: “+” indicates that  has positive effects on the variable value with a positive change in the corresponding tax. 
 “-” indicates that  has negative effects on the variable value with a positive change in the corresponding tax,  
“Ambiguous” indicates that we cannot identify the effects of  on the variable value with a positive change in the 
corresponding tax. 
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 Table 2.3 Coefficients for Elasticities in Selected Variable Solutions 
Variables      
 -0.0249 -0.0366 -0.0044 -0.0012 0.0000 
 -0.0249 -0.0366 -0.0044 -0.9350 0.0000 
 -0.0249 -0.0366 0.0626 -0.0012 0.0000 
 -0.0249 -0.0366 0.0626 -0.0012 -0.0007 
 -0.0249 --0.0366 -0.0006 -0.0012 0.0000 
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Table 2.4 Effects of GHG Tax Change for  
Variables =1%  (Unit: %) 
 -0.0264 
 -0.1198 
 0.2247 
 0.2240 
 -0.0101 
 -0.0005 
 0.0662 
 -0.0007 
 -0.0008 
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Table 2.5a Percentage Change of Outputs with , for Different  
Variables = 0 = 0.1 = 0.3 = 0.5 
 -0.0263 -0.0264 -0.0266 -0.0269 
 -0.0263 -0.1198 -0.3067 -0.4938 
 0.2248 0.2247 0.2245 0.2243 
 0.2241 0.2240 0.2237 0.2235 
 -0.0100 -0.0101 -0.0103 -0.0106 
 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 
Table 2.5b Optimal GHG Tax for Different  
 = 0 = 0.1 = 0.3 = 0.5 
     
 
 34 
Table 2.6a Percentage Change of Outputs with , for Different  
Variables = 0 = 0.1 = 0.2 = 1 = 2.5 = 3.75 = 5 
 -0.0099 -0.0104 -0.0108 -0.0143 -0.0209 -0.0264 -0.0319 
 -0.1033 -0.1037 -0.1042 -0.1077 -0.1143 -0.1198 -0.1253 
 -0.0099 -0.0037 0.0026 0.0526 0.1465 0.2247 0.3029 
 -0.0107 -0.0044   0.0018 0.0519 0.1458 0.2240 0.3022 
 -0.0099 -0.0099 -0.0099 -0.0099 -0.0100 -0.0101 -0.0102 
 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0007 
 
Table 2.6b Optimal GHG Tax for Different  
 = 0 = 0.1 = 0.2 = 1 = 2.5 = 3.75 = 5 
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CHAPTER 3 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND BIOFUEL PATHWAYS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: CLOSED ECONOMY ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduction  
Large scale production of biofuels could have significant effects on global agricultural activities, 
energy markets, and the environment. However, the precise nature of those effects is likely to 
vary depending on the mix of biofuels and feedstocks. Biofuels can be made from a variety of 
feedstocks using a number of different processes, i.e., different biofuel pathways. The leading 
biofuel candidates are ethanol and biodiesel. Our focus is on ethanol. Ethanol derived from corn 
is the major biofuel under production currently in the United States. Second generation biofuels, 
cellulosic ethanols, are under intensive study now. The common belief is that cellulosic ethanol 
is better in terms of both greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and competition with food crops for 
land (Groode and Heywood 2007; Khanna et al. 2009; Schmer et al. 2008; Wang et al. 1999; and 
Wang et al. 2007). However, current technology for cellulosic ethanol is not cost competitive 
compared to corn ethanol (Khanna et al. 2009; and Perrin et al.2008). With limited resources, 
especially for land used to grow the feedstocks, promoting an efficient mix of biofuel pathways 
is an important consideration in improving energy security and fighting climate change.  
 
Several important policy questions surround markets for biofuels, including: 
1) What is the most economically efficient mix of biofuel pathways under potential policies?  
2) How do environmental policies influence the market for biofuels and thus the food 
market? 
 
Because these questions involve interactions among different markets simultaneously, 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling is well-suited to their analysis. CGE models 
have been widely used in sectoral analyses of policy changes or exogenous events, such as the 
introduction of innovative technologies. Several CGE applications have addressed bioenergy 
(e.g., Cunha and Scaramucci 2006); Kancs et al. 2002; and Steininger and Voraberger 2003). 
Most of them focus on economic impact evaluation. Some recent CGE applications to biofuels 
consider greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., Ignaciuk et al. 2006; and Korobeinikov et al. 2006).  
However, none of these studies have considered the potentials for water quality impacts from 
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fertilizer use associated with feedstock production. Life cycle analyses have revealed that the 
production of some biofuel may exacerbate nutrient loads in the aquatic environment (e.g., 
Franke and Reinhardt 1998; Hill et al. 2006; and Puppan 2002). Without consideration of the 
water quality impacts, decisions about energy policies could lead to unintended and unwanted 
outcomes for water quality.  
 
This chapter assesses the economic and environmental impacts of the different biofuel pathways 
using a closed-economy CGE model of the United States. Closed-economy models are fairly 
common in evaluating bioenergy impacts (e.g., Johansson and Azar 2007; and McDonald and 
Thierfelder 2005). Currently, a major issue motivating bioenergy analyses is the competition 
between food products and bioenergy feedstocks due to constraints on the availability of land. 
Since land is not internationally tradable, a closed-economy model can provide insights into the 
issues that are of most concern, especially for countries where internal markets dominate the 
economy. The US is such an economy.  
 
The major differences between this chapter and other CGE applications on bienergy are that this 
work explicitly models the use of fertilizer and its contribution to both greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and nitrogen (N) leaching, and that the model incorporates both first-generation and 
second-generation biofuels, with second generation biofuels (cellulosic ethanol) as an alternative 
technology to produce ethanol. The focus of this chapter is to anticipate the mix of pathways that 
most efficiently balances economic and environmental considerations under the influence of 
public policies.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the environmental impacts of 
different biofuel pathways. Then, the essential elements of the general equilibrium model are 
described. The following section discusses the data sources and technology assumptions used in 
the model.  Various model scenarios with results are presented later and followed by sensitivity 
analyses.  
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3.2 Environmental Impacts of Biofuel Pathways 
Different biofuel pathways have different effects on global agricultural activities, energy markets, 
and most importantly for this study, the environment. For example, Miller et al. (2007) reports 
that while ethanol produced from corn can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about 15%, that 
produced from cellulosic feedstocks can reduce them by 90%. Furthermore, cellulosic feedstocks 
from perennial grasses require little nitrogen and phosphorus as compared to corn and thus have 
the potential to substantially reduce nitrogen and phosphorus runoff from the cropland where 
they are grown. Figure 3.1 illustrates the tradeoff between improved climate change potential 
and water quality degradation resulting from different biofuel feedstocks (Miller et al, 2007).  
 
With different assumptions and experimental conditions, the environmental emission values can 
vary dramatically. For corn ethanol, net GHG emissions are widely debated. Liska et al. (2009) 
used the Biofuel Energy Systems Simulator (BESS) to estimate that corn ethanol is responsible 
for approximately 50% less GHG emissions than gasoline per energy equivalent unit. The 
Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation (GREET) model (Wang 
et al. 2007) developed at Argonne National Laboratory  estimates an 18% to 28% GHG 
reductions for corn ethanol versus gasoline.  The Energy and Resources Group Biofuel Analysis 
Meta-Model (EBAMM) developed by Farrell et al. (2006) calculates a GHG reduction with corn 
ethanol of about 13%.  
 
In all the models, N2O from the application of nitrogen fertilizer is one of the major GHGs 
associated with corn production. Based on a study by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Klein et al. 2006), most current studies of bioethanol assume that the conversion factor 
from N fertilizer to N2O is about 1%.  However, Crutzen et al. (2007) argued the conversion 
factor should be 3 ~ 5%. Based on the latter conversion factor, together with the high climate 
change potency of N2O compared to CO2, their results show a net increase of GHG emissions 
from corn ethanol compared to gasoline.  
 
Compared to corn ethanol, cellulosic ethanol has an advantage with respect to GHG emissions. 
Studies on switchgrass ethanol show a relatively consistent result of GHG emissions 80% to 94% 
below those from gasoline (Adler et al. 2007; Schmer et al. 2008; and Wang et al. 1999).  
 38 
 
Another perennial grass, miscanthus, has drawn a lot of attention as an ethanol feedstock because 
of its high yield, low inputs, and excellent carbon sequestration potential. Because miscanthus is 
a relatively “new” ethanol feedstock, few studies have explicitly studied its GHG emissions. A 
life cycle analysis conducted by Khanna et al. (2009) reports up to 94% GHG reduction from 
miscanthus ethanol compared to gasoline. The same study reports that switchgrass ethanol has a 
slightly lower global warming benefit -- up to 87% reduction in GHGs emissions compared to 
gasoline. 
 
Another environmental concern associated with biofuel feedstock production is water pollution. 
Phosphate and nitrate are the major causes for eutrophication and hypoxia. However, when 
considering nutrient leaching from feedstock production, phosphate has the lowest leaching rate 
among the major plant nutrients due to its low mobility in soil -- 0 to 1.75 kg P/ha/year for 
mineral soils (Mengal and Kirkby 2001) and less for heavy arable soil (Cooke and Williams 
1970). The leaching rate for nitrogen is much higher. Based on a study by Jaakkola (1984), 
leaching of nitrogen from clay soil is 17 kg N/ha/year on average for cereal crops. Other studies 
report even higher nitrogen leaching rates, especially for corn. Based on 57 nitrate leaching 
measurements in 15 field-scale studies, Miller et al (2006) calculated a mean leaching rate of 
39.8±26.6 kg N/ha/year for corn production. Since the leaching rate of phosphate is quite low 
compared to nitrate, and the total application of P fertilizer is only about 35% of total N 
application (ERS/USDA: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FertilizerUse/), in this study, only the N 
content of fertilizer is explicitly modeled. P and other nutrients are aggregated with other sectors.  
 
It is generally believed that applying more fertilizer results in more nitrogen leaching. However, 
the leaching rate is affected by many other factors as well, such as the timing and method of 
fertilizer application, the use of stabilizers, irrigation rates, vegetative cover, and soil porosity 
(Canter 1996). Also, nitrate leaching can be an accumulative process. It is very hard to apply a 
single value to represent the nitrogen leaching rate for the production of a certain feedstock in 
different locations, and the functional relationship between fertilizer application and nitrogen 
leaching is debatable. Thus, in this study, the amount of fertilizer, instead of nitrogen leaching, is 
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explicitly modeled. With the fertilizer application amount being explicitly modeled, the 
emissions of N2O can be separated from other GHGs.  
 
N fertilizer is a very important nutrient for corn production and the application amounts are well 
documented by USDA (ERS, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FertilizerUse/). However, since 
switchgrass and miscanthus are not commercially produced, this study must rely on experimental 
data on nutrient use in their production. For switchgrass, although many studies have examined 
the relationship between nutrient additions and productivity, a consensus about nitrogen 
application has not emerged. The recommendations for nitrogen application range from minimal 
application up to a rate comparable to corn production (Parrish and Fike 2005). For miscanthus, 
studies have been done on several sites in Europe and the results show that production does not 
respond to N fertilizer from the second and third years onwards (Christian and Haase 2001). In 
the life cycle study by Khanna et al. (2009), based on previous studies and field trials, they 
assumed that the annualized N application for switchgrass is 50.4 kg/ha, and 25.3 kg/ha for 
miscanthus for an “optimistic” scenario, and 126 kg/ha for switchgrass and 50.7 kg/ha for 
miscanthus in a “pessimistic” scenario. This rates compared to the N fertilizer application rate 
for corn production of 146 kg/ha.  
 
Clearly, with different production pathways, the same final product (ethanol) can have different 
environmental impacts. Since this study incorporates multiple biofuel pathways in one model, it 
is appropriate to use data for the different pathways from the same source if possible. In this 
analysis, the technology represented by the optimistic case from Khanna et al. (2009) for 
miscanthus and switchgrass production is used. Sensitivity analyses are conducted later to test 
how different assumptions affect the results.   
 
3.3 Model Structure 
This single region closed-economy model builds on the general equilibrium model of Arrow and 
Debreu (1954). The outcomes satisfy Walrasian equilibrium. The sectoral foci of this model are 
various ethanol pathways, petroleum-energy, and the food market. In order to focus on energy 
and food markets, other sectors are highly aggregated. This model assumes one representative 
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consumer and one competitive producer for each production process. The detailed model 
specifications are discussed below. 
 
3.3.1 Production 
The major production sectors include grain (GRN), other crops (OCP) which includes all the 
other crop production, other food (OFD) which includes meat, dairy and all processed food, 
petroleum-energy (FUE), other energy (OEG) which includes coal, natural gas, and electricity, 
nitrogen fertilizer (FER), ethanol, which can be produced from grain, swithgrass, and miscanthus, 
and the rest of other consumptions goods (ROG). The definitions for all the sectors are defined in 
Table 3.1. All of the producers in the economy are assumed to be profit maximizers with zero 
profits. The major inputs to production include capital, labor, land, fertilizer, energy and other 
intermediate inputs.  
 
Besides the traditional inputs, in this study, GHG emissions are also assumed to be inputs. 
Producers can be thought of as either using clean environmental resources to produce their 
products or buying permits to emit GHGs. At the margin, the price for an environmental input is 
its tax rate or permit price. In the model, only petroleum-fuel (FUE) and other energy (OEG) are 
the direct emitters of CO2. The emissions from the other commodities, including various types of 
ethanol, are actually from their consumption of these two energy inputs. The CO2 emissions from 
combustion of ethanol are assumed to be zero since the CO2 embedded in these emissions were 
taken up from the atmosphere during biomass growth (Wang et al. 1999). The N2O emissions 
from fertilizer, however, have no such offset. The N2O emissions are calculated as a fixed 
percentage of the fertilizer applied and then are added into the total GHG emissions. GHG 
emissions, such as CH4, generated from other production processes are not major concerns in this 
study and their emissions are excluded from our model.    
 
The production processes for all final goods are assumed to follow nested Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) functions. With a CES production technology, inputs for production in the 
same “nest” have the same value of the elasticity of substitution. Each nest is defined as a 
standard CES functional form, which is written as  
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  (3.1) 
where  is the output,  is the scale parameter,  is the amount of input ,   is the share 
parameter of that input, with , and  is the constant elasticity of substitution 
between all  in the nest. The CES functional form is fairly flexible and can easily be 
transformed to represent common production technologies. If the elasticity of substitution  = 1, 
then the production function reduces to a Cobb-Douglas technology. When  approaches infinity, 
the inputs in the production process are perfect substitutes. When  approaches zero, the 
production process follows a Leontief technology.  
 
All production processes are separated into intermediate inputs and value-added. Energy inputs 
go into the value-added part at the same level as capital. Capital, land and labor are endowments 
in the system. We assume that their total quantities are fixed. By fixing the total amount of land, 
only the land harvested in the benchmark year (2004) is considered. This excludes the 
possibilities of planting energy crops on land not cropped in 2004. Although this is an artificially 
rigorous constraint, it avoids the need to address issues of the productivity of the land that might 
be brought into cultivation and the GHG emissions from disturbing fallow areas. Thus, we omit 
the land change possibilities and keep the focus on the policy implications. Ruling out the 
possibilities of increased total available acres of land is likely to overstate the competition 
between food and fuel crop production.    
 
Producers have the ability to choose between petroleum-energy (FUE) and ethanol. Ethanol can 
be produced from three different feedstocks: grain, miscanthus, and switchgrass. The final 
products are all ethanol in the market. To simplify the exposition, we call the final products grain 
ethanol (CET), miscanthus ethanol (MET) and switchgrass ethanol (SET). Fertilizer is a value-
added input and is substitutable with other factors. We assume carbon emissions from each 
energy product are proportional to the total demand for that commodity. As an example, the 
production process for grain can be represented by a production tree as shown in Figure 3.2.  
Other production processes follow similar structures with different inputs.   
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3.3.2 Consumption 
The representative consumer maximizes utility by choosing consumption levels for each 
commodity subject to a budget constraint. The consumption goods include food, energy, and 
nonfood. Food is a composite commodity encompassing grain (GRN), other crops (OCP), and 
other food (OFD). As with the producers, the consumer makes his choice between petroleum-
energy and ethanol which is composed of CET, MET and SET. The utility tree for the 
representative consumer is shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
As with the producers, consumer utility is represented by nested Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) functions. As an example, the first stage of the nested structure is formulated 
as:   
  (3.2) 
The utility for the consumer is represented by . The share parameter for commodity or 
composite commodity  is , and the substitution parameter for the first stage utility is 
represented by . The consumer’s demand for commodity  is represented by . The utility 
level is cardinal and the scale parameter for the utility function is set to one.  
 
The consumer’s choice problem is subject to a budget constraint equal to the sum of income 
from capital, labor and land endowment, and transfers from production taxes and environmental 
taxes.  
 
3.4 Data Sources 
This large-scale model requires many functional parameters. However, relatively few data points 
on which to base these parameters are available, so econometric methods cannot be used to 
estimate them. Instead, we use calibration to obtain the required parameters. We first collect data 
for a benchmark year in which the markets are assumed to have been in equilibrium. Then, we 
compute model parameters so that the equilibrium solution of the economy satisfies all model 
equations. With the calculated parameters, new equilibria under different scenarios can then be 
simulated.  
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Our benchmark year is 2004. Following customary procedures in CGE modeling, the benchmark 
equilibrium is summarized in the form of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). This is a flow-of-
funds matrix for an economy and represents flows of all economic activities/transaction within 
this economy. The data in the SAM table used in this study are from Global Trade and Analysis 
Program (GTAP) version 7.0 (Narayanan and Walmsley 2008) with appropriate aggregation and 
disaggregation. The GTAP 7.0 data are transformed into a SAM at the desired aggregation level 
following the method of McDonald and Thierfelder (2004).  
 
GTAP 7.0 aggregates fertilizer into the chemical sector. To separate out N fertilizer, we first 
obtain the N fertilizer usage for different crops from USDA (ERS/USDA: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FertilizerUse/). The market price for N fertilizer was $0.25/lb in 
2004 (Schnitkey 2004). We assume the production of fertilizer follows the technology defined by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) benchmark account 2002 
(http://www.bea.gov/industry/io_annual.htm).  
 
Since individual biofuel sectors are not included in GTAP 7.0, one of the major challenges in 
constructing the SAM used in this study lies in representing the ethanol sector. Taheripour et al. 
(2007) have developed the GTAP_BIO database based on GTAP 6.0 (Dimaranan, 2006) with the 
introduction of grain-based ethanol, sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel. All ethanol in the 
benchmark equilibrium is grain-based. It is separated from the processed food sector as in 
GTAP_BIO. The production technology of CET is assumed to follow the GTAP_BIO database 
with 2004 production and price data5
 
. Since, currently, ethanol is mainly used in a blend with 
gasoline to serve the transportation market, the consumption of ethanol follows the GTAP_BIO 
assumption that the consumer is the final buyer of ethanol.  
Switchgrass ethanol and miscanthus ethanol are not currently in commercial production in the 
United States. In our model, we treat them as two non-profitable alternative technologies to 
produce ethanol. With the introduction of different policies, these two bioethanol pathways 
might become cost-competitive and start to produce. The production technology parameters for 
                                                 
5 According to EIA (2007), total production of grain-based ethanol in 2004 was 3400 million gallons, and the 
average price for grain-based ethanol was $1.69/gallon, http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html 
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both feedstocks and ethanol are based on the optimistic scenario in the study conducted by 
Khanna et al. (2009). Later, sensitivity analysis is conducted to test the effects of different 
scenarios. 
  
In our model, the ultimate sources of pollution are petroleum energy (FUE), other energy (OEG) 
and fertilizer (FER). The environmental impacts from all other commodities depend on their use 
of these inputs. Data for carbon emissions from petroleum energy (FUE) and other energy (OEG) 
are from GTAP (Lee 2008). We assume carbon emissions are proportional to the domestic usage 
of petroleum-energy and other energy and the benchmark carbon tax rate is assumed to be zero. 
Fertilizer contributes not only to GHG emissions as N2O, but also to nitrate leaching to surface 
waters. We assume both N2O releases and nitrogen leaching are proportional to fertilizer 
application. The total GHG emissions for the system are a weighted potency-sum of CO2 
emissions from FUE and OEG and N2O emissions from fertilizer. 
 
Besides the construction of the SAM, the elasticities of substitution comprise another important 
set of parameters in CGE applications. Most of the elasticities used here are from the GTAP 
database. Following the GTAP setup, the highest level of production processes – the relationship 
between value-added and intermediate inputs -- follows the Leontief technology. Elasticities of 
substitution between the factors of production -- land, labor, fertilizer and capital-energy 
composite -- for different production processes come from GTAP, using the elasticity values 
between primary factors for similar sectors. The original GTAP model does not include a capital-
energy composite. However, the GTAP_E model (Burniaux and Truong 2002) incorporates 
greenhouse gas effects. We use the elasticity of substitution between capital and energy in the 
capital-energy composite from GTAP_E.  
 
For the consumption side, the elasticity values are very difficult to define due to sectoral 
definitions that differ from the literature. For the upper-most level in the utility tree, 
transportation energy (refined petrofuel and ethanol) and food are two very inelastic sectors. 
Many studies have estimated the price elasticity of gasoline. Two meta-analysis (Espey 1996; 
and Goodwin et al. 2004) found that the average price-elasticity of demand for gasoline is 
around -0.25 in the short run. Based on the consumption ratio of energy, the elasticity of 
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substitution between energy and other commodities would be less than 0.2. A more recent study 
found that the price elasticities of gasoline demand ranged from -0.034 to -0.077 during 2001 to 
2006 versus -0.21 to -0.34 for 1975 to 1980 (Hughes et al. 2007). This indicates that the demand 
for gasoline has become less elastic. We use a value of 0.2 for the elasticity of substitution 
between energy, food and other commodities within the top-most level in the utility tree. Later a 
sensitivity analysis is conducted to test how this value affects the results. The sub-level in the 
food sector is assumed to follow the widely used Cobb-Douglas functional form, i.e., the 
elasticities of substitution among GRN, OCP and OFD are one.  
 
Due to a lack of adequate data, few studies have estimated the elasticities of substitution between 
petroleum energy and bioethanol. In a modified GTAP_E model application by Birur et al. 
(2008), the elasticity of substitution between petroleum energy and biofuel for the US is defined 
as 3.95. With this value, they are able to reproduce, with reasonable precision, the biofuel 
production observed between 2001 and 2006. We use the same value in this model. The different 
ethanol pathways are represented as a single final product with different technologies.  
 
3.5 Model Scenarios and Results 
The model is written in the GAMS-MSPGE environment (Rutherford, 1987). Beginning with the 
model defined above, one or more of the policy parameters can be changed to obtain a 
counterfactual equilibrium. By comparing the new equilibrium with the benchmark equilibrium, 
we can identify the effects of the changed policy parameter(s) for the economy and the 
environment. We start our analyses by evaluating the effects of current (2009) energy policies. 
 
3.5.1 Effects of Current Policies 
Currently in the United States, the major federal policies are designed mainly to stimulate 
ethanol production. One of the major policies is the ethanol subsidies authorized in the 2008 
Farm Bill (P.L. 110-246, Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008). The Farm Bill reduces 
the previous $0.51/gallon ethanol subsidy for corn ethanol to $0.45/gallon and adds a cellulosic 
ethanol subsidy of $1.01/gallon.  
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In the benchmark year for our model, 2004, ethanol producers were subject to the $0.51/gallon 
subsidy. To evaluate the pure effects of current policies, we replaced the $0.51/gallon ethanol 
subsidy with the new subsidy. The new subsidy results in corn ethanol production of 3.1 billion 
gallons and no cellulosic ethanol. This production level is much below the quantity requirement 
defined by the Renewal Fuel Standard (RFS) program established in the Energy Policy Act of 
2005. In 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (H. R. 6) amended the 
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) and increased the required renewable fuel volume. The 
expanded RFS is generally refers as RFS2. For example, the volume requirement for 2008 was 
increased from 5.4 billion gallons to 9 billion gallons, and the final goal of RFS2 is 36 billion 
gallons of renewable fuels by 2022, including 16 billion gallons from cellulosic feedstocks. 
Without technology changes or the intervention of other policies, our model suggests that the 
RFS targets are unlikely to be achieved.  
 
Current energy policies have evolved due to changes of technology and market conditions, and 
environmental and political pressures. However, data limitation precludes calibration of our 
model beyond the year 2004. Since we are not able to track current reality with the model, we 
propose and analyze some hypothetical policies instead. To explore the pure effects of these 
hypothetical policies, we eliminated the $0.51/gallon ethanol subsidy and recalibrated the model 
as a policy-free benchmark.  
 
The focus of this study is the environmental impacts of biofuel production and the economic and 
environmental consequences of public policies intended to mitigate those impacts. Since taxes 
are an efficient means of deterring environmental externalities, we test three types of externality 
taxes: CO2 tax, N fertilizer tax, and GHG tax, and then compare their effects on biofuel 
production and environmental discharges.  
 
3.5.2 Effects of CO2 Tax (TC) 
In the benchmark equilibrium, there are no constraints on carbon or nitrogen emissions. However, 
since increased production of biofuels has been justified, in part, by arguments about their lesser 
carbon footprints, we introduce a carbon tax as an incentive to control climate change.  
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To date, no federal restriction has been placed on carbon emissions in the United States. 
However, several local efforts have introduced regional carbon trading schemes. The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a non-profit corporation to support the implementation of 
the CO2 trading program of the participating states which include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
The trading price for this system is about $3/ton of CO2 (http://www.rggi.org/co2-
auctions/results). Currently, the European Union (EU) has the largest carbon trading market. In 
the EU market, the price has varied from less than 3¢ to over $40 per ton of CO2 
(http://www.carboncapital.com/kyoto_and_carbon_trading.php#11). The trading price for this 
fledgling market in a time of economic dislocation and rapid greenhouse policy evolution is not 
reliable. Instead, the price for the RGGI system ($3/ton) is chosen as the lower bound of TC 
tested in this study and the upper bound is chosen to be $40/ton.  
 
As discussed before, we eliminated the $0.51/gallon ethanol subsidy from the benchmark. All of 
the equilibrium results are documented as percentage changes from the subsidy-free 2004 
benchmark. The new equilibrium results are shown in Figures 3.4a to 3.4c, which presents the 
percentage change of prices, production, and emissions respectively. The full results are 
documented in Appendix C.  
 
As shown in Figure 3.4a, TC has the greatest impact on prices of OEG, FUE and ethanol. OEG 
and FUE are directly affected by TC. Ethanol is a close substitute for FUE and its energy 
requirement for production is fairly high, so its price is also affected significantly by TC. Since 
FUE and OEG are either a direct or an indirect input for all commodities, the prices of all 
commodities increase, but at a relatively low rates. Producers adjust output based on the new 
prices.  Correspondingly, production of FUE and OEG decreases. To satisfy the energy demands 
of consumers and producers, production of CET increases because it is less carbon-intensive than 
FUE. The impact on overall GHG emissions is surprisingly small. A $40/ton TC rate would 
reduce GHG emissions only approximately 1.5%. 
  
Surprisingly, a CO2 tax also reduces N leaching although by very small amount. Production of 
fertilizer is highly energy-intensive. Taxes on carbon also affect the fertilizer price. GRN is the 
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most fertilizer-intensive product in the economy. However, GRN is a major input for CET 
production. The boost in CET production raises the demand for GRN, but the change is very 
small. The overall percentage change in GRN production is much less than that of CET since 
only a fraction of GRN is used to produce CET. Although the production of GRN increases, the 
higher price of fertilizer actually inhibits its use. A $40/ton TC would reduce N fertilizer 
application by 0.4%.  
 
3.5.3 Effects of N Fertilizer Tax (TN) 
Besides GHG emissions, N leaching is also an important issue. Although a CO2 tax reduces 
nitrogen leaching, the effect is very small. If we want to control N leaching, a tax on N fertilizer 
tax seems likely to have more consequences. To test the effects of TN, this tax alone is introduced 
into the system. Such a tax has not been used at the federal level. However, although farmers are 
often exempted from such taxes, most states tax fertilizer. In the states where farmers are not 
exempted, TN ranged from $0.0001 to $0.00075 per kg in 1996. This compares to a fertilizer 
price of about $0.3/kg (Uri 1999). Several studies have simulated the impacts of a higher TN. 
Based on Indiana agricultural data, Quiroga et al. (1995) concluded that a TN that is 417% of the 
fertilizer price would be required to reduce fertilizer use by 30%. Pfeiffer and Whittlesey (1978) 
used a linear programming model to estimate the required TN to meet the water quality target 
(0.30mg/l) in the Yakima Basin of Washington. The tax was determined to be $1.32/kg, 
equivalent to 400% of the fertilizer price at that time. Based on a nonlinear mathematical 
programming model for Iowa field crop production, Huang and Lantin (1993) suggested that a 
tax rate in excess of 200% would be required to eliminate all nitrate leaching in corn production 
with rotation. Thus, all of these studies indicate that a relatively large TN is required to achieve a 
substantial effect.  
 
In this study, a wide range of TN values, from $0.01/kg to $1.2/kg (1.8% to 218% of the 
benchmark fertilizer price), are applied to the model to test how such a tax affects GHG 
emissions and nitrogen leaching. Figures 3.5a to 3.5c show the percentage changes of quantities 
and prices under new equilibria compared to the benchmark equilibrium. Figure 3.6d illustrates 
the sources of ethanol in the market. The underlying data are in Appendix D. As shown in Figure 
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3.6, TN has noticeable effects only on GRN, OCP and CET. Its effects on the other sectors are 
negligible. 
 
Just as with TC, TN increases prices for all consumption goods, with the price of GRN increasing 
the most. However, it decreases the price of land slightly. With a positive TN, due to the intensive 
nitrogen requirement of GRN, producers of GRN and OCP reduce their production, which drives 
down the land price. Other things equal, the substitutability of land for fertilizer would increase 
the price of land as a consequence of more costly fertilizer.  However, when other markets are 
included in the analysis, the substitution of land for fertilizer is not sufficient to overcome the 
downward pressure on land price due to reductions in GRN and OCP. Food demand is fulfilled 
by an increase in OFD production. As TN increases, substitution between fertilizer and land 
becomes more likely and this pushes the land price upward but not enough to fully offset the 
reduction in OCP and total GRN outputs with the tax rates tested in this study. After cellulosic 
ethanol starts to produce, the rate of increase of land price starts to slow down because cellulosic 
crops are less fertilizer-intensive. 
 
With a positive TN, production of GRN and OCP declines since fertilizer is an important input. 
However, their proportionate reductions are much less than the reduction in ethanol because only 
a small fraction of GRN is used to produce ethanol and the rest is used for food, for which 
demand is relatively inelastic. With fertilizer-intensive GRN as the most important input, 
production of ethanol declines as TN increases. A TN of approximately $1/kg makes corn ethanol 
more costly to produce than miscanthus ethanol. Producers of ethanol would switch to 
miscanthus as the preferred feedstock, under the assumption that the transition is not costly. The 
shift from corn ethanol to miscanthus ethanol would cause a major reduction in GRN production. 
As TN increases further, the reduction of GRN would slow down due to the inelastic demand for 
food. The rate of reduction in ethanol production would slow down too because miscanthus is 
less N-intensive. As a close substitute for ethanol, production of FUE increases as ethanol 
decreases. However, since the benchmark volume of FUE is much greater than ethanol, a very 
small percentage increase in FUE would compensate for the reduction of ethanol. 
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While TN reduces nitrogen leaching, it has almost no net effect on GHG emissions. As discussed 
before, TN increases the consumption of FUE, which is the most carbon-intensive fuel. Since the 
percentage change in FUE output is very small, and GHGs decline from less fertilizer usage, the 
net percentage change of GHG emissions is very small. A TN increase of 145% reduces nitrogen 
use by slightly more than 10%.  
 
3.5.4 Effects of GHG Tax (TG) 
N fertilizer not only contributes to N leaching, but also emits N2O gas which is a potent GHG. 
The global warming potential of N2O in a time horizon of 100 years is 298 times of CO2 (Forster 
et al. 2007). To control climate change, it would be more appropriate to apply a tax not only to 
CO2 emissions, but also to N2O. In this section, GHG taxes are applied to the system to test their 
effects. The range of the taxes tested is the same as the CO2 tax we tested in Section 3.5.2, $3/ton 
to $40/ton of CO2-equivalent. The new equilibrium results are shown in Figures 3.6a to 3.6c, and 
the full equilibrium results are documented in Appendix E.  
 
As shown in Figure 3.6, the effects of TG are very similar to the effects of TC. The major 
differences lie in the prices and production of GRN and ethanol, since they are affected by 
fertilizer tax the most. Just as with TC, a $40/ton TG is not enough to induce a switch to cellulosic 
ethanol and it reduces both GHG emissions (1.7%) and fertilizer application (4%).  
 
3.5.5 Comparison of Policy Instruments 
In this section, we apply the three policy instruments to the system to compare their performance. 
The three instruments levy taxes on different commodities. With TC, FUE and OEG are directly 
subject to the tax; with TN, only fertilizer is subject to the tax; and with TG, FUE, OEG and 
fertilizer are all subject to the tax. Assume the tax burden for GHGs is $20/ton of CO2-equivalent 
and the corresponding tax rates are TC = $20/ton, TN = $0.12/kg, and TG = $20/ton. The resulting 
equilibrium is presented in Figures 3.7a to 3.7c. Complete results are documented in Appendix F.  
 
TC and TG have very similar effects on the production of FUE and OEG, on which TN has almost 
no effect. In terms of ethanol production, TC yields the highest increase, while TN would actually 
decrease output. It is interesting that TC and TG result in similar reduction in GHG emissions. 
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Even though only TG applies to fertilizer, the tax burden on fertilizer increases energy 
consumption as the same time as it reduces N2O emissions. The two effects on GHG emissions 
are opposite and the net effect is negligible. Thus the tax burden on energy plays the most 
important role with TG. TG also induces the most fertilizer use reduction. Although TG induces 
the highest food price increase, aggregated consumption, although lower than the benchmark 
level, actually is greater than in the TC case. Thus TG performs better than TC in terms of both 
consumption and environmental emissions. TN performs the best in terms of consumption but 
produces less environmental benefits. 
 
Another way to compare the three policy instruments is to set a policy target and test the tax rates 
to achieve the target. Since ethanol is produced as a substitute for FUE to reduce GHG emissions 
and increase energy security, we use an ethanol production level as our policy target and 
calculate the tax rates needed to achieve this target. As discussed in Section 3.5.3, a fertilizer tax 
alone would reduce ethanol production. Thus, to achieve the ethanol production increase target, 
the only options are the CO2 tax or GHG tax among the three policy instruments. The tax rates to 
achieve a range of ethanol production increase target, 1% to 50%, are shown in Figure 3.8. The 
kink points in both curves show the points when ethanol producers shift from CET to MET. The 
results indicate that to achieve significant increases in ethanol production, very high tax rates are 
required. Other policy instruments might be more effective to achieve production targets. 
Between the two taxes, the CO2 tax is more effective in stimulating total ethanol production. A 
lesser GHG tax triggers the cellulosic ethanol production because of the tax burden on fertilizer 
application.   
 
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis  
The data used in our model is subject to considerable uncertainty. One of the major sources of 
uncertainty is the technology data for cellulosic ethanol production. The elasticities of 
substitution and the emissions rates may also be debated. In this section, different values are 
tested to see how sensitive the results are to these parameters. In this analysis, the policy 
instrument is held constant: a $20/ton TG. 
 
3.6.1 Cellulosic Grass Production Data 
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In the analyses above, the technology data for cellulosic ethanol production were adapted from 
the optimistic scenario in Khanna et al. (2009), which represents a rather ideal situation for 
cellulosic grass production: low fertilizer application rate, low replanting probability, high yield, 
and low harvest loss. However, the cultivation processes in field trials vary widely. In their study, 
they also presented a “pessimistic” scenario. To test how the technology data affect the results, 
we examine their pessimistic production data. The responses of the pessimistic system to the 
policy shocks appear in Tables 3.2a to 3.2c, alongside the optimistic case results.   
 
The policy shock yields exactly the same results. With $20/ton GHG tax, all ethanol is produced 
from corn. Thus the two scenarios wouldn’t yield any differences. Different production data for 
cellulosic ethanol would only yield different results if the policy shock is sufficient to induce a 
switch to cellulosc ethanol. The differences between the two scenarios would depend on the level 
of impacts of cellulosic ethanol production on the whole economy.  
 
The pessimistic scenario does increase the policy thresholds for cellulosic ethanol production. 
Under the optimistic case, a $133/ton CO2 tax, a  $84/ton CO2-equivalent GHG tax, or a $0.95/kg 
N fertilizer tax (173% of benchmark fertilizer price) would be required for miscanthus ethanol to 
be cost competitive. However, for the pessimistic case, the required tax rates would be 
TC=$232/ton, TG=$174/ton, or TN=$1.76/kg (320% of benchmark fertilizer price). Thus, the 
conclusions about tax rates to stimulate the production of cellulosic ethanol are highly sensitive 
to the technology surrounding cellulosic ethanol production.  
 
3.6.2 Elasticities of Substitution 
Several elasticities of substitution play important roles in the analysis. One is the elasticity of 
substitution at the top utility level, . In the previous analysis,  is assumed to be 0.2. As 
discussed before, some recent study suggests that it could be lower. However, technology 
development (e.g., electric cars) would make substitution easier. If the results are sensitive to , 
a more accurate estimate of this parameter would be required to improve the model’s 
performance. To test its sensitivity, we start from the extreme case where there is no substitution 
in the upper level of the utility tree and then test several values between 0 and 1. The percentage 
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changes of production levels and emissions are presented in Figure 3.9a and the complete results 
are documents in Appendix G.  
 
The value of  affects significantly the demand for all types of energy. As  increases, 
consumers can shift to other goods more easily and this reduces energy demand. The reduction in 
energy consumption correspondingly reduces GHG emissions. As shown in Figure 3.9a, the 
curves of energy production and emissions are all downward sloping. Thus overestimation of  
(true  is lower than the value used in the model) would yield overestimates of the reductions in 
FUE and OEG production and GHG emissions.  
 
Another key elasticity concerns the substitution between petro-fuel and ethanol, . Few studies 
have estimated this elasticity. The common belief is that they are close but not perfect substitutes. 
The 3.75 value used in this study is adopted from a GTAP study (Birur et al. 2008). The range 
tested for this parameter is from 1 to 5. The results are shown in Table 3.9b and details can be 
found in Appendix H. With a GHG tax,  mainly affects the ethanol consumption level and 
secondarily the consumption of FUE. However, due to the large benchmark value of FUE, its 
percentage change is small with the $20/ton GHG tax. As  increases, production of FUE 
decreases and production of CET increases. When  is low enough, the GHG tax would reduce 
both gasoline and ethanol production because of the low substitutability between FUE and 
ethanol.  As  increases, the substitution becomes easier. Thus, under the same policy shock, a 
higher  would result in higher ethanol production and lower FUE production. An 
overestimated  would overstate the reduction of FUE production and the increase in ethanol 
production. Regarding environmental issues,  has minimal impact on GHG emissions and 
nitrogen fertilizer use.   
 
3.6.3 Emission Data 
As discussed before, different studies report various emission values. Even when the reported 
values are consistent, the assumptions behind these studies can be quite different. One such 
assumption is the conversion factor from N fertilizer to N2O. The most commonly-used value for 
the conversion factor is 1% based on IPCC (2006). However, Crutzen et al. (2007) believes that 
the value should be between 3% and 5%. In the analyses above, we used a factor of 1.3% based 
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on GREET 1.8 (Wang et al. 2007). In this section, different conversion factors are tested to see 
how the model responds. The percentage changes of production levels and emissions are 
presented in Figure 3.9c and the complete results are documents in Appendix I.  
 
As the conversion factor increases, the effect is equivalent to increasing the tax burden on 
fertilizer since the fertilizer is subject to a higher GHG tax per unit of fertilizer applied. As 
discussed in Section 3.5.3, a fertilizer tax mainly affects ethanol production and fertilizer 
application. The conversion factor would also mainly affect these two variables. If the 
conversion factor is high, a GHG tax would reduce ethanol production because GRN, the main 
input for ethanol, is highly fertilizer-intensive. Although production of GRN decreases as the 
conversion factor increases, its change is not very dramatic due to the inelasticity of food 
demand. If the conversion factor is overestimated, the predicted nitrogen leaching would be 
notably higher than it actually would be.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Our closed economy general equilibrium model provides some insights into how biofuel policy 
options would affect the energy and food sectors, GHG emissions and nitrogen fertilizer use.  
 
A CO2 tax would reduce FUE and OEG consumption and increase ethanol demand. Net GHG 
emissions would be reduced, and N fertilizer application would also decline because fertilizer 
production is fuel-intensive. A $40/ton CO2 tax would reduce GHG emissions by only 1.5% and 
fertilizer application by 0.4%. On the other hand, a fertilizer tax would have negative effects on 
both ethanol production and fertilizer use. Its effects on production of FUE and OEG, and GHG 
emissions would be fairly small. A GHG tax is practically a combination of a CO2 tax and a 
fertilizer tax. A GHG tax, like CO2 tax, would reduce FUE and OEG consumption and increase 
ethanol demand. Both GHG emissions and nitrogen leaching would also be reduced with a GHG 
tax. A $40/ton GHG tax would reduce GHG emissions by only 1.7% and fertilizer application by 
4%. Comparison of the three tax instruments reveals that GHG and CO2 taxes have very similar 
effects on FUE and OEG consumption, and reduction of GHG emissions. The GHG tax is the 
most effective policy to reduce nitrogen leaching. In terms of stimulating ethanol production, the 
CO2 tax is the most effective. Our results also indicate that very high tax rates are required to 
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stimulate cellulosic ethanol production. When cellulosic ethanol is produced, miscanthus ethanol 
dominates switchgrass due to its lower production cost. With current technology and modest 
levels of taxation, the ethanol production will still be dominated by corn as the feedstock. 
 
Depending on the focus of the analysis, improvements in some parameter estimates could play 
an important role in decision making. If the policy maker is primarily focused on stimulating 
cellulosic ethanol production, accurate cellulosic ethanol production data are most important. If 
energy security, is the main interest, the elasticity of substitution in consumption, , is very 
important. The quantity of ethanol is fairly sensitive to all the parameters we tested, ,  and 
conversion factors. In terms of environmental emissions, GHG emissions are very sensitive to  
and nitrogen leaching is affected substantially by the conversion factor from N fertilizer to N2O.  
 
This chapter employed a closed economy model to assess the mix of biofuel pathways, and 
associated economic and environmental considerations, under the influence of public policies. 
The use of a closed economy model is instructive for studying domestic tradeoffs. However, 
despite the fact that internal markets dominate the US economy, its trading activities are large 
and important especially for the agricultural and fossil fuel sectors. Neglecting the trading effects 
on the domestic market probably exaggerates the competition among sectors for land and other 
resources. Incorporating the possibility of trading would definitely improve the accuracy of 
analysis. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1 Definition of Sector Abbreviation  
Abbreviation Sector 
GRN Grain 
OCP Other crops 
OFD Other food, including meat, dairy and all processed food 
FUE Refinery petroleum-energy 
OEG Other energy, including coal, natural gas, and electricity 
FER Nitrogen fertilizer 
ROG Rest of other consumption goods 
CET Corn ethanol 
MET Miscanthus ethanol 
SET Switchgrass ethanol 
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Table 3.2a % Change in Production with Different Production Data * (Unit: %) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
GRN 0.03 0.03 
OCP -0.28 -0.28 
OFD 0.05 0.05 
ROG -0.01 -0.01 
OEG -0.83 -0.83 
FUE -0.81 -0.81 
CET 0.03 0.03 
 
Table 3.2b % Change in Prices with Production Data (Unit: %) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
GRN 3.40 3.40 
OCP 1.59 1.59 
OFD 0.83 0.83 
ROG 0.81 0.81 
OEG 4.33 4.33 
FUE 3.72 3.72 
FER 6.63 6.63 
CET 4.20 4.20 
Labor 0.81 0.81 
Land 0.41 0.41 
 
Table 3.2c % Change of Environmental Variables with Production Data (Unit: %) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
CO2 equivalent GHG -0.83 -0.83 
N Fertilizer Use -2.03 -2.03 
 
* For details of the ethanol production scenarios, please see Khanna et al (2009) 
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Figures 
Figure 3.1 Eutrophication Potential vs. % Reduction in Global Warming Potential for Various Bio-
based Products  
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Figure 3.2 Grain Production Tree 
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Figure 3.3 Consumer Utility Tree 
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Figure 3.4a % Change of Prices with Different TC 
 
 
Figure 3.4b % Change of Production with Different TC 
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Figure 3.4c % Change in Emissions with Different TC 
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 Figure 3.5a % Change of Prices with Different TN 
 
 
Figure 3.5b % Change of Domestic Production with Different TN 
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Figure 3.5c % Change of Emissions with Different TN 
 
 
Figure 3.5d Sources of Ethanol in the US Market with Different TN 
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Figure 3.6a % Change of Prices with Different TG 
 
 
Figure 3.6b % Change of Production with Different TG 
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Figure 3.6c % Change in Emissions with Different TG 
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Figure 3.7a % Change of Energy Production with Different Policy Schemes 
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Figure 3.7b % Change of Food Prices with Different Policy Schemes 
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Figure 3.7c % Change of Emissions and Utilities with Different Policy Schemes 
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Figure 3.8 Tax Rates Required to Achive Ethanol Production Targets 
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Figure 3.9a Impacts of  on Domestic Production and Environmental Emissions 
 
 
Figure 3.9b Impacts of  on Domestic Production and Environmental Emissions 
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Figure 3.9c Impacts of Conversion Factor on Domestic Production and Environmental Emissions 
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CHAPTER 4 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND BIOFUEL PATHWAYS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: OPEN ECONOMY ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
Large scale production of biofuels would have significant effects on global agricultural activities, 
energy markets, and the environment. Biofuels can be made from a variety of feedstocks using a 
number of different processes, i.e., different biofuel pathways, and different biofuel pathways 
may have different effects on both economy and the environment. The common belief is that 
cellulosic ethanol is better in terms of both greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and competition 
with food crops for land (Groode and Heywood 2007; Khanna et al. 2009; Schmer et al. 2008; 
Wang et al. 1999; and Wang et al. 2007). However, current technology for cellulosic ethanol is 
not cost competitive compared to corn ethanol (Khanna et al. 2009; and Perrin et al. 2008). With 
limited resources, especially for land used to grow the feedstocks, promoting an efficient mix of 
biofuel pathways is an important consideration in improving energy security and fighting climate 
change.  
 
The previous chapter employed a closed economy CGE model to assess the economic and 
environmental impacts of the mix of different biofuel pathways under the influence of various 
public policies. However, despite the fact that internal markets dominate the US economy, its 
trading activities are large and important. In 2004, the total value of the imports and exports 
accounted for 15% and 10% of the US total GDP, respectively 
(http://www.trade.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/H04T05.html). The agricultural and 
energy sectors are leading areas of US trade. Approximately 20% of US demand for petroleum 
products and over 90% for crude oil are imported (EIA: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/oil_market_basics/trade_im
age_us_imports.htm). At the same time, the US exported over $60 billion worth of agricultural 
commodities, accounting for approximately 8% of total export value (ERS/USDA: Foreign 
Agricultural Trade of the United States, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Fatus/http://www.trade.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/H04T
03.html). With energy and food as our focal sectors, it is important to consider trade effects. In 
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this chapter, we extend the closed economy model developed in the last chapter into an open 
economy model and re-evaluate the policy effects on the mix of biofuel pathways.    
 
Open economy CGE models have been widely used to evaluate policies. Generally, open CGE 
models include multiple countries/regions at similar levels of detail (e.g., Narayanan and 
Walmsley 2008; Pant 2007; and van der Menbrugghe 2005). However, if a single country is of 
primary interest, or the data for the other countries are not reliable, a single country CGE model 
enriched with demand and supply functions incorporating international influences may suffice to 
produce the desired insights (e.g., Fullerton et al. 1981; Lofgren et al. 2002; and Rausch et al. 
2009). Many single-country open CGE models are designed for small economies, so world 
prices are fixed (e.g., Harris 1984; Lofgren et al. 2002; and Stifel and Thorbecks 2003). However, 
as a huge economy entity, changes in the trade patterns of the United States can influence world 
prices. Thus, it is not appropriate to assume fixed world prices. Thus in this chapter, we develop 
a large open economy model to re-evaluate the effects of policies on the mix of biofuel pathways 
and the corresponding environmental impacts.    
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the essential elements of the 
general equilibrium model. The following section discusses the data sources and technology 
assumptions used in the model.  Next, various model scenarios and results are presented, 
followed by sensitivity analyses.  
 
4.2 Model Structure and Data Sources 
Our open economy model specifications and data sources are the same as the closed economy 
model described in Chapter 3 except that this model allows trade between the US and the rest of 
the world. The United States has two-way trade, which means that it imports and exports the 
same commodity in a single period. This can be explained by imperfect substitution between 
imported, exported and domestically produced goods. If they are perfect substitutes, imports and 
exports should not happen simultaneously for a single commodity. Following the commonly-
used Armington  assumption (Armington 1969), the commodities in the market, as intermediate 
inputs for production or final consumer consumptions, are Armington composite goods from 
imports and domestic production following a CES functional form, written as  
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  (4.1) 
where  is the output of the i-th Armington composite good,  is the productivity parameter of 
the i-th composite good production function,  is the amount of import of i-th good,  is the 
amount of domestic production of i-th good,  is the share parameter of the import of i-th 
composite good, and  is the Armington elasticity, representing the  elasticity of 
substitution between the domestic production and imports. The Armington elasticity is adapted 
from GTAP 7.0 for each sector. 
 
Many commodities are exported in a large amount from the United States, so assuming fixed 
world prices is not appropriate. In our model, a large open economy is assumed and the world 
prices can change due to the quantities traded. Due to data limitation and to focus on markets in 
the United States, we represent the rest of the world by trade transformation functions. Here we 
follow the technique provided by Markusen (2002) to formulate the export functions. Domestic 
consumption and exports follow a Cobb-Douglas functional form. With different values of the 
foreign elasticity of export demand obtained from GTAP 7.0, the share parameters in the Cobb-
Douglas functions can be calibrated.  
 
4.3 Model Scenarios and Results 
4.3.1 Effects of Current Policies 
As in Chapter 3, we first analyze the effects of current (2009) energy policies by removing the 
$0.51/gallon ethanol subsidy in the benchmark and apply the current subsidies ($0.45/gallon 
subsidy for corn ethanol and $1.01/gallon subsidy for cellulosic ethanol) into the system. With 
the new subsidy policy, the market supplies 3.25 billion gallons of ethanol, including 0.14 billion 
gallons of imported ethanol. None of the ethanol is produced from cellulosic feedstocks. Just as 
with the closed-economy model, this level is much lower than the quantity requirement defined 
by the Renewal Fuel Standard (RFS) program.  
 
Once again following the pattern established in Chapter 3, in the following sections, we test the 
effects of three types of hypothetical taxes: CO2 tax, N fertilizer tax and GHG tax.  Following 
consideration of the individual taxes and their effects on biofuel production and environmental 
externalities, we compare their effects with each other.  
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4.3.2 Effects of CO2 Tax (TC) 
In the benchmark equilibrium, there are no environmental constraints on carbon emissions. 
However, since increased production of biofuels has been justified, in part, by arguments about 
their lesser carbon footprints, we introduce a carbon tax as an incentive to control climate change. 
The tax rates range tested in this chapter is the same as the last chapter: $3/ton to $40/ton of CO2 
tax. The benchmark is also the 2004 economy without the $0.51/gallon of ethanol subsidy. 
However, the open-economy benchmark differs from the closed-economy counterparts because 
they are simulated results. The new equilibrium results are shown in Figures 4.1a to 4.1e which 
present the percentage changes of domestic prices, domestic production, imports, exports and 
environmental variables, respectively. Figure 4.1f illustrates the sources of ethanol in the market. 
The full lists of the equilibrium results appear in Appendix J. 
 
As shown in Figure 4.1a, TC has the greatest impacts on prices of OEG, ethanol and FUE. OEG 
and FUE are directly affected by TC. Ethanol is a close substitute for FUE and its energy 
requirement for production is fairly high, so its price is also affected significantly by TC. Since 
FUE and OEG are either a direct or an indirect input for all commodities, the prices of all 
commodities increase, but at relatively low rates. Producers adjust output based on the new 
prices. Correspondingly, production of FUE and OEG decrease the most. Even with 
compensation through increased imports and decreased exports, domestic energy use still 
declines. To satisfy the energy demands of consumers and producers, production of CET 
increases because it is less carbon-intensive than FUE. Its import also increases to satisfy the 
domestic demand. The impact on overall GHG emissions is surprisingly small. A $40/ton TC 
would reduce GHG emissions approximately 2%. 
 
As a close substitute for FUE, production of ethanol increases. As the major input for ethanol 
production, domestic production of GRN also increases and cause more nitrogen fertilizer use. 
Although the price of fertilizer increases due to its reliance on energy inputs, its elastic foreign 
demand and a high elasticity of substitution between its domestic production and imports limit 
the price increase. Thus, overall, nitrogen use increases with TC. A $40/ton TC would increase N 
fertilizer application by 0.06%. 
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4.3.3 Effects of N Fertilizer Tax (TN) 
As we discussed before, nitrogen leaching is also a very important environmental externality. If 
only CO2 is taxed, nitrogen leaching would be exacerbated. To control nitrogen leaching, a N 
fertilizer tax (TN) is needed. We now test the effects of such a tax.  
 
As with the closed economy model, a wide range of TN values, from $0.01/kg to $1.2/kg (1.8% 
to 218% of the benchmark fertilizer price), are applied to the model to test how such a tax affects 
GHG emissions and nitrogen fertilizer use. Figure 4.2a to 4.2e show the percentage changes of 
quantities and prices under new equilibria compared to the benchmark equilibrium. Figure 4.2f 
illustrates the sources of ethanol in the market. The underlying data appear in Appendix K. As 
shown in Figure 4.2, TN has noticeable effects only on GRN, OCP and CET. Its effects on the 
other sectors are negligible. 
 
Just as with TC, TN increases prices for all commodities. As the most fertilizer-intensive product, 
the price of GRN increases the most. However, the price of land falls. With a positive TN, due to 
their intensive nitrogen requirement, producers of GRN and OCP reduce their production, which 
drives the land price down. The substitution effect between fertilizer and land, that would 
increase the price of land, is not sufficient to overcome the land price drop from the reduction in 
production of GRN and OCP. Food demand is fulfilled by increased imports, decreased exports 
of GRN and OCP, and an increased supply of OFD.    
 
With fertilizer-intensive GRN as the most important input for corn ethanol, as TN increases, 
production of ethanol declines. The proportionate reduction of GRN production is much less than 
that of ethanol because only a small fraction of GRN is used to produce ethanol and the rest is 
served as food, for which demand is relatively inelastic.  
 
A TN greater than $1/kg makes corn ethanol more costly to produce than miscanthus ethanol. 
Under the assumptions that the cost and time for technology transition are negligible, producers 
of ethanol would switch to miscanthus as a feedstock. The shift from corn ethanol to miscanthus 
ethanol would cause a major reduction in GRN demand and correspondingly, the supply of GRN. 
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This explains the kink points on the GRN curve in the graphs of domestic production (Figure 
4.2b) and imports (Figure 4.2c).  
 
One interesting finding is that TN reduces not only the domestic production of ethanol, but also 
its imports. Commonly, we would expect that with reduced domestic production, imports of 
ethanol would increase to fulfill the domestic demand. With TN, however, the price of ethanol 
increases much more than the price of FUE. In the absence of quantity mandates for ethanol, 
consumers would choose more FUE and less ethanol. Thus domestic consumption of FUE would 
increase and domestic demand for ethanol would decline. The reduction in demand would affect 
not only domestic production but also imports, although the reduction of imports is at a lower 
rate than the decline in domestic production.  
 
TN reduces nitrogen leaching but has very little effect on GHG emissions. Although TN increases 
the consumption of FUE, the most carbon-intensive fuel, since the percentage change in the 
output level of FUE is very small, and N2O declines from less fertilizer usage, the net percentage 
change of GHG emissions is very small. A 145% TN reduces nitrogen leaching by slightly more 
than 10%.  
 
4.3.4 Effects of GHG Tax (TG) 
N fertilizer not only contributes to N leaching, but also emits N2O gas which is an important 
GHG. The global warming potential of N2O in a time horizon of 100 years is 298 times of CO2 
(Forster et al. 2007). To control the climate change, it would be more appropriate to apply a tax 
not only to CO2 emissions, but also to N2O. In this section, GHG taxes are applied to the system 
to test their effects. The range of the taxes tested is the same as the CO2 tax we tested in Section 
4.3.2, $3/ton to $40/ton of CO2-equivalent. The new equilibrium results are shown in Figures 
4.3a to 4.3f. and the full equilibrium results are documented in Appendix L  
 
As shown in Figure 4.3, the effects of TG are very similar to the effects of TC. The major 
differences lie in the prices and production of GRN and ethanol, since they are affected by a 
fertilizer tax the most. As a source of N2O emissions, fertilizer is also subject to TG. OCP 
production decreases because fertilizer is an important input. GRN is the most fertilizer-intensive 
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product in the economy. Thus, its domestic production falls more than OCP. However, GRN is a 
major input for CET production. The increased demand of GRN from the boost in CET 
production increases the imports of GRN and reduces its exports. Unlike the scenario with TC, 
with TG, fertilizer application is reduced due to the domestic reductions of GRN and OCP. A 
$40/ton TG would reduce GHG emissions approximately 2% and fertilizer use by approximately 
3.5%. As with TC, a $40/ton TG is not enough to induce a switch to cellulosic ethanol. 
 
4.3.5 Comparison of Policy Instruments 
In this section, we apply the three policy instruments to the system to compare their performance. 
The three instruments levy taxes on different commodities. With TC, FUE and OEG are directly 
subject to the tax; with TN, only fertilizer is subject to the tax; and with TG, FUE, OEG and 
fertilizer are all subject to the tax. Assume the tax burden for GHGs is $20/ton of CO2-equivalent 
and the corresponding tax rates are TC = $20/ton, TN = $0.12/kg, and TG = $20/ton. The resulting 
equilibrium is presented in Figures 4.4a to 4.4d. Complete results are documented in Appendix 
M.  
 
CO2 tax and GHG tax have very similar effects on the production of FUE and OEG, on which 
the fertilizer tax has almost no effect. As indicated by Figure 4.4a and 4.4d, the CO2 tax yields 
the highest increase in ethanol production and imports, while the fertilizer tax would actually 
decrease ethanol production. One interesting finding is that TC and TG result in similar reduction 
in GHG emissions. The reason is that the GHG tax burden on fertilizer increases energy 
consumption as the same time as it reduces N2O emissions. The two effects on GHG emissions 
are opposite and the net effect is negligible. Thus the tax burden on energy plays the most 
important role to reduce GHG emissions with a GHG tax. The fertilizer tax induces the most 
fertilizer use reduction, although the difference compared to the reduction with GHG tax is 
insignificant. The GHG tax induces the highest food price increase and the greatest reduction in 
aggregate consumptions. Thus, the GHG tax performs the best in terms of GHG emissions but 
the worst in terms of aggregate consumption. The fertilizer tax is the most effective in reducing 
nitrogen fertilizer application and yields the highest aggregation consumption, but the climate 
change benefit is minimal.  
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Another way to compare the three policy instruments is to set a policy target and test the tax rates 
required to achieve the target. As in Chapter 3, ethanol use is assumed as our policy target and 
the tax rates (CO2 tax or GHG tax) needed to achieve this target are calculated. The policy 
targets range from a 1% to a 50% increase in ethanol use. The results are shown in Figure 4.5. 
The kink points in both curves show the points when the ethanol producer shifts from CET to 
MET. The results indicate that, to achieve a significant increase in ethanol production, very high 
tax rates are required. Other policy instruments might be more effective to achieve quantity 
targets. Between the two taxes, the CO2 tax achieves the ethanol production targets at lower rates. 
However, at high tax levels, more specifically, after the switch to cellulosic ethanol, the GHG tax 
is more effective although the differences are small. A much lower GHG tax is required to 
trigger the cellulosic ethanol production because of the tax burden on fertilizer application.   
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
The data used in our model is subject to considerable uncertainty. One of the major sources of 
uncertainty is the technology data for cellulosic ethanol production. Other key parameters 
include the elasticity of substitution and emission values. In this section, different values are 
tested to see how sensitive the results are to these parameters. In this analysis, the policy 
instrument applied is held constant: TG=$20/ton. 
 
4.4.1 Cellulosic Grass Production Data 
In the analyses above, the technology data for cellulosic ethanol production were adapted from 
the “optimistic” scenario in Khanna et al. (2009). That scenario represents a rather ideal situation 
for cellulosic grass production: low fertilizer application rate, low replanting probability, high 
yield, and low harvest loss. However, the results of field trials vary widely. In their study, they 
also presented a “pessimistic” scenario. To test how the technology data affect the model results, 
we adopt the data for their “pessimistic” production scenario. The responses of the system to the 
policy shocks are replicated in Tables 4.1a to 4.1f, juxtaposed to the results of the “optimistic” 
case for comparison.   
 
With the two scenarios, the policy shock yields exactly the same results. With a $20/ton GHG 
tax, all the ethanol in the market is produced from corn and no cellulosic ethanol is produced. 
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Thus the two different scenarios wouldn’t yield any differences. Different production data of 
cellulosic ethanol would only yield different results when cellulosc ethanol is produced with the 
same policy shock, and the differences between the two scenarios would depend on the level of 
impacts of cellulosic ethanol production on the whole economy.  
 
However, the pessimistic scenario does increase the policy thresholds for cellulosic ethanol 
production. Under the optimistic case, a $142/ton CO2 tax, a $90/ton CO2-equivalent GHG tax, 
or a $1.18/kg of N fertilizer tax (215% of benchmark fertilizer price) would be required for 
miscanthus ethanol to be cost competitive. However, for the pessimistic case, the required tax 
rates would be TC=$260/ton, TG=$194/ton, or TN=$3.25/kg N fertilizer (589% of the benchmark 
fertilizer price). Thus, the conclusions about tax rates to stimulate the production of cellulosic 
ethanol are highly sensitive to the technology surrounding cellulosic ethanol production.  
  
4.4.2 Elasticities of Substitution 
Several elasticities of substitution play important roles. One is the elasticity of substitution at the 
top utility level, . In the previous analysis,  is assumed to be 0.2. Some recent studies 
suggest that it could be lower as discussed in the Data section. However, technology 
development (e.g., electric cars) could make substitution easier. If the results are sensitive to , 
a more accurate estimate of this parameter would be required to improve the model’s 
performance. To test its sensitivity, we start from the extreme case where there is no substitution 
in the upper level of the utility tree and then test several values between 0 and 1. The percentage 
changes of production levels and emissions are presented in Figure 4.6a and the complete results 
are documents in Appendix N.  
 
The value of  affects the demand of all types of energy the most. With a low value of , the 
substitutability of energy with other commodities is low. As  increases, consumers can shift to 
other goods more easily and this reduces energy demand. The reduction in energy consumption 
correspondingly reduces GHG emissions. As shown in Figure4.6a, the curves of energy 
production and emissions are all downward sloping. Thus overestimation of  (true  is lower 
than the value used in the model) would yield overestimates of the reductions in FUE and OEG 
production and GHG emissions.  
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Another key elasticity concerns the substitution between petro-fuel and ethanol, . Few studies 
have estimated this elasticity. The common belief is that they are close but not perfect substitutes. 
The 3.75 value used in this study is adopted from a GTAP study (Birur et al. 2008). The range 
tested for this parameter is from 1 to 5. The results are shown in Table 4.6b and details can be 
found in Appendix O. With a GHG tax,  mainly affects ethanol use. The level of FUE also is 
affected. However, due to its large benchmark value, the percentage change in FUE is fairly 
small with the $20/ton GHG tax. As  increases, production of FUE decreases and production 
of CET increases. When  is low enough, a GHG tax would also reduce ethanol production 
because of the low substitutability between FUE and ethanol.  As  increases, the substitution 
becomes easier. Thus, under the same policy shock, a higher  would result in higher ethanol 
production and lower FUE production. An overestimated  would overstate the reduction of 
FUE production and increase in ethanol production. Regarding environmental issues,  has 
minimal impact on GHG emissions and nitrogen leaching.   
 
4.4.3 Emission Data 
As discussed before, there is variation in emission estimates. Even when the reported values are 
consistent, the assumptions behind these studies can be quite different. One such assumption is 
the conversion factor from N fertilizer to N2O. The most commonly-used value for the 
conversion factor is 1% based on the IPCC study (2006). However, Crutzen et al. (2007) believe 
that the value should be between 3% and 5%. In the analyses above, we used a factor of 1.3% 
based on GREET 1.8 (Wang et al., 2007). In this section, we test different conversion factors to 
see how the model responds. The percentage changes of production levels and emissions are 
presented in Figure 4.6c and the complete results are documents in Appendix P.  
 
As the conversion factor increases, the effect is equivalent to increasing the tax burden on 
fertilizer since the fertilizer is subject to a higher GHG tax per unit of fertilizer applied. As 
discussed in Section 4.3.3, a fertilizer tax mainly affects the production of GRN, OCP and 
ethanol, and the level of nitrogen leaching. The conversion factor would also mainly affect these 
variables. If the conversion factor is high, a GHG tax would reduce ethanol production because 
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GRN, the main input for ethanol, is highly fertilizer-intensive. If the conversion factor is 
overestimated, the predicted nitrogen leaching would be notably higher than it actually would be.   
 
4.5 Conclusion 
We developed an open economy CGE model to quantify the effects of biofuel policies on the 
energy and food sectors, GHG emissions, and nitrogen fertilizer use.  
 
A CO2 tax applied would reduce FUE and OEG consumption and increase ethanol demand. Total 
GHG emissions are reduced as expected. Nitrogen leaching is increased because production of 
GRN, the most fertilizer-intensive product, rises with a CO2 tax. A $40/ton CO2 tax would 
reduce GHG emissions by 2% and increase nitrogen leaching by 0.06%. On the other hand, a 
fertilizer tax would have negative effects on ethanol production and decrease N leaching. Its 
effects on production of FUE and OEG, and GHG emissions are fairly small. A GHG tax is 
practically a combination of CO2 tax and fertilizer tax. Similar to a CO2 tax, a GHG tax would, 
reduce FUE and OEG consumption and increase ethanol demand. Both GHG emissions and 
nitrogen leaching would also be reduced with a GHG tax. A $40/ton GHG tax would reduce 
GHG emissions by 2% and nitrogen fertilizer use by 4%. Comparison of the three tax 
instruments reveals that GHG tax and CO2 tax have very similar effects on FUE and OEG 
consumption, and reduction of GHG emissions. A fertilizer tax is the most effective policy to 
reduce nitrogen leaching. In terms of stimulating ethanol production, a CO2 tax is the most 
effective. Our results also indicate that very high tax rates are required to stimulate cellulosic 
ethanol production. When cellulosic ethanol is produced, miscanthus ethanol dominates 
switchgrass due to the lower production cost of miscanthus ethanol. With current technology and 
modest levels of taxation, the ethanol production will still be dominated by corn ethanol. 
 
Depending on the focus of the analysis, improvements in some parameter estimates could play 
an important role in decision making. If the policy maker is primarily focused on stimulating 
cellulosic ethanol production, accurate cellulosic ethanol production data are most important. If 
energy security, i.e., production and consumption of energy, is the main interest, the elasticity of 
substitution in consumption, , is very important. The quantity of ethanol is fairly sensitive to 
all the parameters we tested, ,  and conversion factors. In terms of environmental emissions, 
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GHG emissions are very sensitive to  and nitrogen fertilizer use is affected substantially by the 
conversion factor from N fertilizer to N2O.  
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Table 
Table 4.1a % Change in Domestic Production with Different Production Data *(Unit: %) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
GRN -0.95 -0.95 
OCP -0.76 -0.76 
OFD 0.09 0.09 
ROG 0.02 0.02 
OEG -2.34 -2.34 
FUE -2.32 -2.32 
 
Table 4.1b % Change in Domestic Price with Production Data (Unit: %) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
GRN 5.22 5.22 
OCP 3.45 3.45 
OFD 2.99 2.99 
ROG 3.02 3.02 
OEG 6.43 6.43 
FUE 6.05 6.05 
FER 6.81 6.81 
CET 6.62 6.62 
Labor 3.02 3.02 
Land 1.43 1.43 
 
Table 4.1c % Change in Imports with Production Data (Unit: %) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
GRN 2.88 2.88 
OCP 0.82 0.82 
OFD -0.13 -0.13 
ROG -0.12 -0.12 
OEG 13.88 13.88 
FUE 5.14 5.14 
FER 9.12 9.12 
 
Table 4.1d % Change in Exports with Production Data (Unit: %) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
GRN 2.88 2.88 
OCP 0.82 0.82 
OFD -0.13 -0.13 
ROG -0.12 -0.12 
OEG 13.88 13.88 
FUE 5.14 5.14 
FER 9.12 9.12 
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Table 4.1e % Change of Environmental Variables with Production Data (Unit: %) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
CO2 equivalent GHG -1.06 -1.06 
N Fertilizer Use -1.81 -1.81 
 
Table 4.1f Ethanol Sources with Different Production Data (Unit: Billion Gallons) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
Domestic CET 1.37 1.37 
Domestic MET  0.00 0.00 
Imported Ethanol 0.11 0.11 
 
* For details of the ethanol production scenarios, please see Khanna et al (2009). 
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Figures 
Figure 4.1a % Change of Domestic Price with Different TC 
 
 
Figure 4.1b % Change of Domestic Production with Different TC 
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Figure 4.1c % Change of Imports with Different TC 
 
 
Figure 4.1d % Change of Exports with Different TC 
 
 88 
Figure 4.1e % Change in Environmental Variables with Different TC 
 
 
Figure 4.1f Sources of Ethanol in the US Market with Different TC 
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Figure 4.2a % Change of Domestic Price with Different TN 
 
 
Figure 4.2b % Change of Domestic Production with Different TN 
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Figure 4.2c % Change of Imports with Different TN 
 
 
Figure 4.2d % Change of Exports with Different TN 
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Figure 4.2e % Change of Environmental Variables with Different TN 
 
 
Figure 4.2f Sources of Ethanol in the US Market with Different TN 
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Figure 4.3a % Change of Domestic Price with Different TG 
 
 
Figure 4.3b % Change of Domestic Production with Different TG 
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Figure 4.3c % Change of Imports with Different TG 
 
 
Figure 4.3d % Change of Exports with Different TG 
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Figure 4.3e % Change in Environmental Variables with Different TG 
 
 
Figure 4.3f Sources of Ethanol in the US Market with Different TG 
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Figure 4.4a % Change of Energy Production with Different Policy Schemes 
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Figure 4.4b % Change of Food Prices with Different Policy Schemes 
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Figure 4.4c % Change of Environmental Variables and Utilities with Different Policy Schemes 
-2.00%
-1.50%
-1.00%
-0.50%
0.00%
0.50%
CO2 Tax
Fertilizer Tax
GHG Tax
GHG Emissions N Fertilizer Use Utility
 
 
Figure 4.4d Sources of Ethanol in the US Market with Different Policy Schemes 
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Figure 4.5 Tax Rates Required to Achive Ethanol Production Targets 
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Figure 4.6a Impacts of  on Domestic Production and Environmental Variables 
 
 
Figure 4.6b Impacts of  on Domestic Production and Environmental Variables 
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Figure 4.6c Impacts of Conversion Factor on Domestic Production and Environmental Variables 
 
 100 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
5.1  Summary 
Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) are at the forefront of environmental policies 
worldwide. Promoting bio-based products is one oft-proposed solution to reduce carbon 
emissions because the feedstocks capture carbon, offsetting at least partially the carbon 
discharges resulting from use of the products. However, several life cycle analyses point out that, 
while biofuels may emit less life cycle net carbon emissions than fossil fuels, they may 
exacerbate other parts of biogeochemical cycles, notably nutrient loads in the aquatic 
environment. The elevated nutrient loads cause hypoxia in several watershed in the United 
States. Added production of nutrient-intensive feedstocks to support increasing use of biofuel 
would be adding to the hypoxia problem.  
 
Biofuels can be made from a variety of feedstocks using a number of different processes, i.e., 
different biofuel pathways, and different biofuel pathways will have different effects on global 
agricultural activities, energy markets, and the environment. With limited resources, promoting 
the most efficient mix of biofuel pathways would be essential. If considered solely as sources of 
energy, biofuels are not economically competitive compared to their petroleum-based 
counterparts. However, when environmental considerations are introduced, biofuels may play a 
role in the market in reducing carbon emissions although this may come at a cost in water 
quality.  In the absence of market correction for the environmental externalities, policies are 
required to promote the production of biofuels. Policies that promote biofuel feedstocks that 
efficiently balance both economic and environmental impacts will be important in improving 
energy security and fighting climate change without exacerbating the problem of hypoxia. 
 
This dissertation first uses a theoretical general equilibrium model to evaluate interactions 
between policies for externality-generating products that are also close substitutes, using the 
biofuel-fossil fuel case as an example. It goes on to develop computable general equilibrium 
models to evaluate how different policies affect the efficient mix of biofuel pathway production 
and the corresponding economic and environmental impacts with a focus on the tradeoff between 
the GHG emissions and nitrogen leaching.  
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Chapter 2 developed a three-sector theoretical general equilibrium model to evaluate the 
interaction effects of multiple policies. The analysis contributes new insights into the theory of 
second-best policies.  Motivated by the case of bio-based ethanol as a substitute for petroleum-
based fuel, our model incorporates two environmental externalities generated by different 
processes that also produce substitute goods. Multiple environmental externalities have been 
rarely considered in the literature. The few studies that incorporate the interactions of multiple 
environmental externalities assume that the externalities are generated from a single activity (e.g., 
Caplan and Silva 2005; and Peterson 1999). In contrast, our scenario generalizes the case of 
biofuel and fossil fuel production and the associated environmental externalities of greenhouse 
gases (GHG) and nitrogen runoff to surface waters. The two environmental externalities are 
associated with two different production processes that yield goods that are substitutes. The 
interaction between the two pollutants acts through the relative demands for the two products. 
Two taxes are available to control the two externalities. Because the two externalites are 
connected through their sources, emissions of both externalities are jointly determined by the two 
taxes and the direction of the effects of one tax on the emissions of the other externality is 
analytically ambiguous. The first-best policy scheme sets each tax equal to its marginal 
environmental damage. However, the first-best policy scheme is not already feasible. Then the 
second-best tax could be lower or higher than the first-best tax, depending on the nature of the 
distortion in the other externality and their interactions between the final goods. In certain 
unlikely cases, the second-best tax could equal the first-best policy. The analytical ambiguity is 
mitigated through the use of a numerical example, where petroleum fuel is chiefly responsible 
for one externality and biofuel is responsible for the other.  Biofuels come in several varieties 
with varying effects on the two externalities. The results of the numerical exercise indicate that a 
tax on the first externality will increase demand for the substitute and production of the 
associated externality. If the benchmark tax on externality 2 is lower than the marginal 
environmental damage and other parameters are set at plausible levels, then the optimal tax on 
externality 1 is less, and could be much less, than the marginal damages associated with 
externality 1. The sensitivity analysis allows us to determine the most important parameters in 
defining the optimal taxes. The second best tax rate for externality 1 is most sensitive to the 
technical parameter in the production process associated with externality 1, and the parameter 
that determines the substitution levels between the two final goods.    
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Chapter 3 developed a closed-economy computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the 
United States to analyze the economic and environmental consequences of alternative biofuel 
feedstocks under existing and potential policies. Closed-economy models are fairly common in 
evaluating bioenergy impacts (e.g., Johansson and Azar 2007; and McDonald and Thierfelder 
2005). Currently, the major issue motivating bioenergy analyses is the competition between food 
products and bioenergy feedstocks due to constraints on the availability of land. Since land is not 
internationally tradable, a closed-economy model can provide insights into the issues that are of 
most concern, especially for countries where internal markets dominate the economy, such as the 
US. Three tax instruments are tested with this model. A CO2 tax applied alone would reduce 
FUE and OEG consumption and increase ethanol demand. Total GHG emissions are reduced as 
expected. However, nitrogen fertilizer use is also reduced a little with this closed-economy 
model because fertilizer is a high fuel-intensive production. On the other hand, a fertilizer tax 
would have negative effects on ethanol production and decrease fertilizer use. Its effects on 
production of FUE and OEG, and GHG emissions are fairly small. A GHG tax is practically a 
combination of CO2 tax and fertilizer tax. A GHG tax would, similar to CO2 tax, reduce FUE and 
OEG consumption and increase ethanol demand. Both GHG emissions and fertilizer use would 
also be reduced with a GHG tax. Among the three tax instruments, GHG tax is the most effective 
policy to reduce nitrogen use, and CO2 tax is the most effective to stimulate ethanol production. 
Our results also indicate that very high tax rates are required to stimulate cellulosic ethanol 
production. And when cellulosic ethanol is produced, miscanthus ethanol dominates switchgrass 
due to the lower production cost of miscanthus ethanol. With current technology and modest 
levels of taxation, the ethanol production will still be dominated by corn ethanol. The sensitivity 
analyses reveal that different objectives are sensitive to different parameters. The tax rates that 
are able to stimulate cellulosic ethanol production are most sensitive to cellulosic production 
costs. Production levels of energy are most sensitive to the elasticity of substitution of the 
consumer’s consumption. The quantity of ethanol is fairly sensitive to all the parameters we 
tested, ,  and conversion factors. In terms of environmental emissions, GHG emissions are 
very sensitive to  and nitrogen fertilizer use is affected substantially by the conversion factor 
from N fertilizer to N2O.  
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Chapter 4 extends the second essay to achieve greater realism by introducing trade between the 
US and other countries in a large open-economy model. Although the use of a closed-economy 
model is instructive for studying domestic tradeoffs, neglecting the trading effects on the 
domestic market probably exaggerates the competition among sectors for land and other 
resources since the trading activities of the US are large and important especially for the 
agricultural and fossil fuel sectors. The same policy shocks examined in Chapter 3 are applied to 
the system and the qualitative results are similar to those of the closed economy model. Due to 
the possibility of trading, supply and demand of feedstocks and fuels are more elastic. The 
results of the closed- and open-economy models shown in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are not 
directly comparable because their benchmarks are different. To show the pure effects of the 
policies we proposed, we obtain our benchmarks by shocking the system by eliminating the 
actual $0.51/gallon ethanol subsidy from the 2004 baseline. Since the two models are different, 
the resulting simulated equilibria, which constitute our benchmarks for the two models, are 
different. However, by representing the model results as percentage changes from the real 2004 
US economy, we can compare the closed economy results to the open economy outcomes. The 
domestic production for each commodity in 2004 is the same in both cases. Since net trades are 
treated as positive or negative endowments for the US market in the closed economy model, the 
domestic demand for each commodity is also the same in 2004 for the two models. Thus, if the 
results are presented as the percentage change from the 2004 US economy, the domestic supplies 
and demands are directly comparable between the two models. To confirm our hypothesis, 
Figure 5.1a to 5.1c show the supply and demand of other energy (OEG), petro-fuel (FUE), and 
corn ethanol (CET) with respect to a GHG tax shocks, with the benchmark as real 2004 economy. 
For the closed-economy model, the domestic supply equals domestic demand. Thus the curve for 
the closed-economy model represents the equilibrium quantities for both domestic supply and 
domestic demand. Clearly, given the same policy shock, the open economy model yields higher 
percentage changes for domestic supply and demand. The different slopes for the curves indicate 
that the domestic supply and demand prediction in the open economy model are more elastic 
with respect to policy shocks than those from the closed model 
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5.2 Caveats and Future Research 
This dissertation employs CGE models to answer policy and environmental questions, 
surrounding the biofuel markets. Due to data credibility and availability, one major issue not 
fully addressed in this dissertation concerns direct and indirect land use change. In this 
dissertation, we assume that the total land endowment is fixed and the land not under production 
in the benchmark equilibrium is not available for production. Ruling out the possibility of 
increased acres of land is likely to overstate the competition between food and fuel crop 
production. As reliable data on productivity levels of marginal land for biofuels become 
available, incorporating marginal land into the analysis would yield more accurate results, 
especially on the impacts of energy policies on food markets.  
 
Another issue around land use change concerns soil organic carbon (SOC) sequestration, 
especially that associated with cellulosic feedstock production. Gebhart et al. (1994) suggest that 
the SOC sequestration by perennial grasses is considerable. The contribution of SOC 
sequestration is ignored in this dissertation due to the lack of scientific data. This might lead to 
an underestimate of the GHG reduction potential for cellulosic ethanol and reduce their apparent 
competitiveness in the market. 
 
The environmental issues associated with biofuel production are one of the foci of this 
dissertation. We consider two major GHGs, CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuel 
and N2O emissions from nitrogen fertilizer application. Methane is another important GHG that 
we neglect in our analysis. The primary source of methane is livestock. In this dissertation, 
livestock is aggregated into the OFD sector. Separating out the livestock sector and including the 
emissions of methane would enhance the GHG analysis. 
 
Because this dissertation focuses on activities in the United States, the rest of the world is 
lumped together in the open economy model. It would be useful and interesting to disaggregate 
the rest of the world so that regional differences, and policy interactions between countries, could 
be understood.  This extension remains for future research.   
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Figures 
Figure 5.1a % Changes of Domestic Supply and Demand of OEG with Respect to GHG Taxes 
 
 
Figure 5.1b % Changes of Domestic Supply and Demand of FUE with Respect to GHG Taxes 
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Figure 5.1c % Changes of Domestic Supply and Demand of CET with Respect to GHG Taxes 
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APPENDIX A 
SOLUTIONS WITH NITROGEN TAX CHANGE  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
where . The definitions of A1 to A5, D1 and D2 are the same as in the paper.  
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APPENDIX B 
DETERMINING THE SIGNS FOR PARAMETERS 
1): A1 
 
  Since , , then . Thus  
 
2): A3 
 
Since , then  
 
3):  
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APPENDIX C  
RESULTS WITH TC WITH CLOSED-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table C1 % Change in Production with Different TC (Unit: %) 
CO2 Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN 0.03 0.11 0.22 0.34 0.46 
OCP 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 
OFD 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
ROG 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
OEG -0.12 -0.42 -0.83 -1.26 -1.68 
FUE -0.13 -0.42 -0.84 -1.24 -1.65 
CET 0.65 2.21 4.54 6.97 9.50 
 
Table C2 % Change in Prices with Different TC (Unit: %) 
CO2 Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN 0.15 0.50 0.99 1.49 1.98 
OCP 0.10 0.34 0.68 1.00 1.32 
OFD 0.11 0.36 0.72 1.06 1.41 
ROG 0.12 0.41 0.81 1.20 1.60 
OEG 0.63 2.13 4.33 6.59 8.93 
FUE 0.54 1.83 3.71 5.66 7.66 
FER 0.24 0.82 1.64 2.47 3.31 
CET 0.44 1.46 2.96 4.50 6.08 
Labor 0.12 0.40 0.80 1.19 1.58 
Land 0.11 0.37 0.72 1.07 1.40 
 
Table C3 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different TC (Unit: %) 
CO2 Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
CO2 equivalent GHG  -0.13 -0.42 -0.83 -1.24 -1.66 
Nitrogen Use -0.03 -0.09 -0.18 -0.28 -0.38 
 
Table C4 Ethanol Sources with Different TC (Unit: Billion Gallons) 
CO2 Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
CET 1.24 1.26 1.29 1.32 1.35 
MET  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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APPENDIX D  
RESULTS WITH TN WITH CLOSED-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table D1 % Change in Production with Different TN (Unit: %) 
Fertilizer Tax ($/kg) 
(% of base price) 
0.01 
(1.81%) 
0.1 
(18%) 
0.3 
(54%) 
0.5 
(91%) 
0.8 
(145%) 
1 
(181%) 
1.2 
(218%) 
GRN -0.02 -0.15 -0.48 -0.84 -1.43 -4.90 -4.91 
OCP -0.02 -0.25 -0.79 -1.45 -2.59 -3.54 -4.65 
OFD 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.31 0.42 0.54 
ROG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
OEG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 
FUE 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.27 0.39 0.41 
 
Table D2 % Change in Prices with Different TN (Unit: %) 
Fertilizer Tax ($/kg) 
(% of base price) 
0.01 
(1.81%) 
0.1 
(18%) 
0.3 
(54%) 
0.5 
(91%) 
0.8 
(145%) 
1 
(181%) 
1.2 
(218%) 
GRN 0.19 1.92 6.23 11.51 21.23 29.66 40.46 
OCP 0.07 0.73 2.37 4.38 8.11 11.39 15.48 
OFD 0.01 0.09 0.30 0.55 1.01 1.42 1.93 
ROG 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
OEG 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
FUE 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
FER 0.38 3.98 12.86 23.70 43.68 60.83 83.11 
Ethanol 0.10 0.99 3.19 5.88 10.85 14.26 15.21 
Labor 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 
Land -0.03 -0.26 -0.71 -1.06 -1.35 -0.77 -0.52 
 
Table D3 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different TN (Unit: %) 
Fertilizer Tax ($/kg) 
(% of base price) 
0.01 
(1.81%) 
0.1 
(18%) 
0.3 
(54%) 
0.5 
(91%) 
0.8 
(145%) 
1 
(181%) 
1.2 
(218%) 
CO2 equivalent GHG  0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 
Nitrogen Use -0.15 -1.51 -4.54 -7.71 -12.46 -16.84 -20.14 
 
Table D4 Ethanol Sources with Different TN (Unit: Billion Gallons) 
Fertilizer Tax ($/kg) 
(% of base price) 
0.01 
(1.81%) 
0.1 
(18%) 
0.3 
(54%) 
0.5 
(91%) 
0.8 
(145%) 
1 
(181%) 
1.2 
(218%) 
CET 1.23 1.20 1.12 1.03 0.88 0.00 0.00 
MET  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.77 
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APPENDIX E  
RESULTS WITH TG WITH CLOSED-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table E1 % Change in Production with Different TG (Unit: %) 
GHG Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
OCP -0.04 -0.14 -0.28 -0.44 -0.60 
OFD 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 
ROG 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
OEG -0.12 -0.41 -0.83 -1.25 -1.68 
FUE -0.12 -0.41 -0.81 -1.20 -1.59 
CET 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 
Table E2 % Change in Prices with Different TG (Unit: %) 
GHG Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN 0.49 1.66 3.40 5.22 7.13 
OCP 0.23 0.78 1.59 2.42 3.27 
OFD 0.13 0.42 0.83 1.24 1.65 
ROG 0.12 0.41 0.81 1.21 1.61 
OEG 0.63 2.13 4.33 6.60 8.94 
FUE 0.54 1.83 3.72 5.66 7.67 
FER 0.95 3.23 6.63 10.20 13.96 
CET 0.61 2.06 4.20 6.41 8.71 
Labor 0.12 0.41 0.81 1.20 1.58 
Land 0.06 0.20 0.41 0.60 0.80 
 
Table E3 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different TG (Unit: %) 
GHG Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
CO2 equivalent GHG  -0.13 -0.42 -0.83 -1.25 -1.67 
Nitrogen Use -0.30 -1.01 -2.03 -3.05 -4.08 
 
Table E4 Ethanol Sources with Different TG (Unit: Billion Gallons) 
GHG Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
CET 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.25 1.25 
MET  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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APPENDIX F  
POLICY COMPARISON WITH CLOSED-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table F1 % Change in Production with Potential Policies (Unit: %) 
 CO2 Tax ($20/ton) Fertilizer Tax ($0.12/kg) GHG tax ($20/ton)  
GRN 0.22 -0.19 0.03 
OCP 0.03 -0.30 -0.28 
OFD 0.01 0.04 0.05 
ROG -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
OEG -0.83 0.00 -0.83 
FUE -0.84 0.03 -0.81 
CET 4.54 -3.69 0.65 
 
Table F2 % Change in Price with Potential Policies (Unit: %) 
 CO2 Tax ($20/ton) Fertilizer Tax ($0.12/kg) GHG tax ($20/ton)  
GRN 0.99 2.36 3.40 
OCP 0.68 0.89 1.59 
OFD 0.72 0.11 0.83 
ROG 0.81 0.01 0.81 
OEG 4.33 0.00 4.33 
FUE 3.71 0.00 3.72 
FER 1.64 4.88 6.63 
CET 2.96 1.21 4.20 
Labor 0.80 0.00 0.81 
Land 0.72 -0.31 0.41 
 
Table F3 % Change of Environmental Variables and Utilities with Potential Policies (Unit: %) 
 CO2 Tax ($20/ton) Fertilizer Tax ($0.12/kg) GHG tax ($20/ton)  
GHG Emissions -0.83 0.00 -0.83 
Nitrogen Use -0.18 -1.84 -2.03 
Utility -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
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APPENDIX G  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF σU FOR CLOSED-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table G1 % Change in Production with Different σU 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 
GRN 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 
OCP -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 
OFD 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
ROG -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 
OEG -0.60 -0.72 -0.83 -0.94 -1.17 -1.39 -1.72 
FUE -0.63 -0.72 -0.81 -0.89 -1.07 -1.24 -1.49 
CET 1.28 0.99 0.65 0.41 -0.18 -0.75 -1.61 
 
Table G2 % Change in Prices with Different σU 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 
GRN 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 
OCP 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.58 1.58 1.58 
OFD 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
ROG 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 
OEG 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.32 4.32 
FUE 3.72 3.72 3.72 3.72 3.71 3.71 3.71 
FER 6.62 6.62 6.63 6.63 6.63 6.63 6.64 
CET 4.20 4.20 4.20 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.18 
Labor 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.83 
Land 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 
 
Table G3 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different σU 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 
CO2 equivalent GHGs -0.63 -0.73 -0.83 -0.93 -1.14 -1.34 -1.63 
Nitrogen Use -2.01 -2.02 -2.03 -2.04 -2.05 -2.06 -2.08 
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APPENDIX H  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF σF FOR CLOSED-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table H1 % Change in Production with Different σF 
 1 2 3 3.75 4 5 
GRN -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
OCP -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 
OFD 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
ROG -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
OEG -0.82 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 
FUE -0.67 -0.73 -0.78 -0.81 -0.81 -0.84 
CET -0.29 0.01 0.38 0.65 0.81 1.31 
 
Table H2 % Change in Prices with Different σF 
 1 2 3 3.75 4 5 
GRN 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 
OCP 1.58 1.58 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 
OFD 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
ROG 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
OEG 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 
FUE 3.72 3.72 3.72 3.72 3.72 3.72 
FER 6.63 6.63 6.63 6.63 6.62 6.62 
CET 4.20 4.20 4.20 4.20 4.20 4.20 
Labor 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.81 
Land 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 
 
Table H3 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different σF 
 1 2 3 3.75 4 5 
CO2 equivalent GHGs -0.78 -0.80 -0.82 -0.83 -0.84 -0.85 
Nitrogen Use -2.03 -2.03 -2.03 -2.03 -2.03 -2.03 
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APPENDIX I  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF CONVERSION FACTOR FOR CLOSED-
ECONOMY MODEL 
Table I1 % Change in Production with Different N Conversion Factors 
CF 1.3% 2% 2.5% 3% 4% 5% 
GRN 0.03 -0.08 -0.16 -0.24 -0.41 -0.59 
OCP -0.28 -0.46 -0.59 -0.72 -1.01 -1.32 
OFD 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.18 
ROG -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
OEG -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 
FUE -0.81 -0.79 -0.78 -0.76 -0.74 -0.71 
 
Table I2 % Change in Prices with Different N Conversion Factors  
CF 1.3% 2% 2.5% 3% 4% 5% 
GRN 3.40 4.80 5.85 6.93 9.24 11.75 
OCP 1.59 2.12 2.51 2.93 3.81 4.77 
OFD 0.83 0.89 0.94 0.99 1.10 1.22 
ROG 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 
OEG 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.34 
FUE 3.72 3.72 3.72 3.72 3.72 3.72 
FER 6.63 9.51 11.67 13.91 18.67 23.82 
CET 4.20 4.91 5.45 6.00 7.18 8.46 
Labor 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Land 0.41 0.25 0.14 0.05 -0.13 -0.29 
 
Table I3 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different N Conversion Factors  
CF 1.3% 2% 2.5% 3% 4% 5% 
CO2 equivalent GHGs -0.83 -0.85 -0.86 -0.88 -0.93 -1.01 
Nitrogen Use -2.03 -3.03 -3.74 -4.46 -5.91 -7.36 
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APPENDIX J  
RESULTS WITH TC WITH OPEN-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table J1 % Change in Domestic Production with Different TC (Unit: %) 
CO2 Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.26 0.34 
OCP 0.03 0.10 0.20 0.29 0.38 
OFD 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.13 
ROG 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
OEG -0.39 -1.23 -2.35 -3.40 -4.40 
FUE -0.36 -1.18 -2.33 -3.47 -4.59 
 
Table J2 % Change in Domestic Price with Different TC (Unit: %) 
CO2 Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN 0.46 1.57 3.22 4.96 6.80 
OCP 0.42 1.43 2.94 4.53 6.21 
OFD 0.42 1.43 2.94 4.53 6.21 
ROG 0.43 1.47 3.02 4.65 6.38 
OEG 0.92 3.12 6.42 9.91 13.62 
FUE 0.87 2.94 6.04 9.31 12.77 
FER 0.52 1.75 3.59 5.53 7.58 
CET 0.81 2.76 5.67 8.76 12.03 
Labor 0.43 1.47 3.01 4.64 6.36 
Land 0.46 1.57 3.20 4.92 6.72 
 
Table J3 % Change in Imports with Different TC (Unit: %) 
CO2 Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN 0.09 0.31 0.62 0.94 1.27 
OCP -0.03 -0.12 -0.23 -0.35 -0.48 
OFD -0.03 -0.11 -0.22 -0.33 -0.45 
ROG -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.13 -0.16 
OEG 1.95 6.68 13.95 21.84 30.39 
FUE 0.74 2.52 5.15 7.88 10.74 
FER 0.25 0.83 1.68 2.54 3.42 
 
Table J4 % Change in Exports with Different TC (Unit: %) 
CO2 Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN -0.04 -0.12 -0.25 -0.38 -0.51 
OCP 0.08 0.26 0.51 0.77 1.03 
OFD 0.08 0.27 0.52 0.76 1.00 
ROG 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.27 0.33 
OEG -9.98 -29.72 -50.91 -65.91 -76.46 
FUE -1.81 -5.94 -11.60 -16.98 -22.10 
FER -0.63 -2.09 -4.18   -6.26 -8.34 
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Table J5 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different TC (Unit: %) 
CO2 Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
CO2 equivalent GHG  -0.16 -0.53 -1.04 -1.55 -2.05 
Nitrogen Use 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 
 
Table J6 Ethanol Sources with Different TC (Unit: Billion Gallons) 
CO2 Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
Domestic CET 1.36 1.38 1.41 1.44 1.47 
Domestic MET  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Imported Ethanol 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 
 
 124 
APPENDIX K  
RESULTS WITH TN WITH OPEN-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table K1 % Change in Domestic Production with Different TN (Unit: %) 
Fertilizer Tax ($/kg) 
(% of base price) 
0.01 
(1.81%) 
0.1 
(18%) 
0.3 
(54%) 
0.5 
(91%) 
0.8 
(145%) 
1 
(181%) 
1.2 
(218%) 
GRN -0.09 -0.91 -2.76 -4.67 -7.43 -9.21 -14.71 
OCP -0.08 -0.77 -2.40 -4.19 -6.97 -8.88 -10.99 
OFD 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
ROG 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09 
OEG 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.11 
FUE 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.25 
 
Table K2 % Change in Domestic Price with Different TN (Unit: %) 
Fertilizer Tax ($/kg) 
(% of base price) 
0.01 
(1.81%) 
0.1 
(18%) 
0.3 
(54%) 
0.5 
(91%) 
0.8 
(145%) 
1 
(181%) 
1.2 
(218%) 
GRN 0.15 1.57 4.92 8.67 14.64 18.91 23.59 
OCP 0.04 0.40 1.26 2.24 3.83 4.98 6.31 
OFD 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.23 0.41 0.53 0.70 
ROG 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11 
OEG 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 
FUE 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.17 
FER 0.26 2.56 7.69 12.93 20.32 24.94 29.38 
Ethanol 0.07 0.75 2.35 4.14 6.98 9.00 11.06 
Labor 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.09 
Land -0.14 -1.40 -4.18 -7.03 -11.09 -13.70 -15.76 
 
Table K3 % Change in Imports with Different TN (Unit: %) 
Fertilizer Tax ($/kg) 
(% of base price) 
0.01 
(1.81%) 
0.1 
(18%) 
0.3 
(54%) 
0.5 
(91%) 
0.8 
(145%) 
1 
(181%) 
1.2 
(218%) 
GRN 0.18 1.83 5.75 10.17 17.28 22.42 20.63 
OCP 0.08 0.85 2.72 4.87 8.43 11.05 14.10 
OFD 0.01 0.07 0.24 0.43 0.75 1.00 1.29 
ROG 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.22 -0.28 -0.34 
OEG -0.01 -0.05 -0.16 -0.28 -0.46 -0.58 -0.80 
FUE 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.04 
FER 0.59 6.03 18.72 32.49 52.97 66.27 76.81 
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Table K4 % Change in Exports with Different TN (Unit: %) 
Fertilizer Tax ($/kg) 
(% of base price) 
0.01 
(1.81%) 
0.1 
(18%) 
0.3 
(54%) 
0.5 
(91%) 
0.8 
(145%) 
1 
(181%) 
1.2 
(218%) 
GRN -0.22 -2.20 -6.61 -11.17 -17.70 -21.88 -26.05 
OCP -0.19 -1.94 -6.00 -10.40 -17.07 -21.55 -26.37 
OFD -0.01 -0.11 -0.36 -0.67 -1.20 -1.60 -2.10 
ROG 0.01 0.07 0.21 0.36 0.59 0.75 0.92 
OEG 0.03 0.30 0.92 1.59 2.62 3.33 4.24 
FUE 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.36 
FER -2.03 -18.58 -46.05 -64.75 -80.94 -87.22 -91.42 
 
Table K5 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different TN (Unit: %) 
Fertilizer Tax ($/kg) 
(% of base price) 
0.01 
(1.81%) 
0.1 
(18%) 
0.3 
(54%) 
0.5 
(91%) 
0.8 
(145%) 
1 
(181%) 
1.2 
(218%) 
CO2 equivalent GHG  0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 
Nitrogen Use -0.15 -1.52 -4.46 -7.39 -11.42 -13.92 -17.44 
 
Table K6 Ethanol Sources with Different TN (Unit: Billion Gallons) 
Fertilizer Tax ($/kg) 
(% of base price) 
0.01 
(1.81%) 
0.1 
(18%) 
0.3 
(54%) 
0.5 
(91%) 
0.8 
(145%) 
1 
(181%) 
1.2 
(218%) 
Domestic CET 1.35 1.32 1.26 1.20 1.11 1.05 0.00 
Domestic MET  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
Imported Ethanol 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 
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APPENDIX L  
RESULTS WITH TG WITH OPEN-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table L1 % Change in Domestic Production with Different TG (Unit: %) 
GHG Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN -0.14 -0.47 -0.95 -1.43 -1.92 
OCP -0.11 -0.37 -0.76 -1.16 -1.58 
OFD 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.15 
ROG 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
OEG -0.38 -1.23 -2.34 -3.38 -4.37 
FUE -0.35 -1.17 -2.32 -3.45 -4.57 
 
Table L2 % Change in Domestic Price with Different TG (Unit: %) 
GHG Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN 0.75 2.54 5.22 8.05 11.06 
OCP 0.49 1.68 3.45 5.32 7.29 
OFD 0.43 1.46 2.99 4.61 6.33 
ROG 0.43 1.47 3.02 4.66 6.40 
OEG 0.92 3.13 6.43 9.92 13.63 
FUE 0.87 2.95 6.05 9.33 12.80 
FER 0.99 3.34 6.81 10.44 14.23 
CET 0.95 3.22 6.62 10.23 14.06 
Labor 0.03 1.47 3.02 4.65 6.37 
Land 0.21 0.70 1.43 2.20 3.03 
 
Table L3 % Change in Imports with Different TG (Unit: %) 
GHG Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN 0.42 1.42 2.88 4.39 5.95 
OCP 0.12 0.40 0.82 1.26 1.72 
OFD -0.02 -0.07 -0.13 -0.19 -0.25 
ROG -0.02 -0.06 -0.12 -0.17 -0.23 
OEG 1.94 6.65 13.88 21.72 30.22 
FUE 0.74 2.52 5.14 7.87 10.72 
FER 1.33 4.49 9.12 13.88 18.76 
 
Table L4 % Change in Exports with Different TG  (Unit: %) 
GHG Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
GRN -0.44 -1.46 -2.93 -4.41 -5.90 
OCP -0.27 -0.92 -1.89 -2.89 -3.92 
OFD 0.06 0.20 0.38 0.55 0.71 
ROG 0.05 0.16 0.29 0.40 0.50 
OEG -9.93 -29.60 -50.73 -65.72 -76.28 
FUE -1.81 -5.92 -11.57 -16.94 -22.05 
FER -4.28 -13.60 -25.40 -35.63 -44.47 
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Table L5 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different TG (Unit: %) 
GHG Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
CO2 equivalent GHG  -0.16 -0.54 -1.06 -1.57 -2.07 
Nitrogen Use -0.27 -0.91 -1.81 -2.70 -3.59 
 
Table L6 Ethanol Sources with Different TG (Unit: Billion Gallons) 
GHG Tax ($/ton) 3 10 20 30 40 
Domestic CET 1.35 1.36 1.37 1.38 1.40 
Domestic MET  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Imported Ethanol 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 
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APPENDIX M  
POLICY COMPARISON WITH OPEN-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table M1 % Change in Domestic Production with Potential Policies (Unit: %) 
 CO2 Tax ($20/ton) Fertilizer Tax ($0.12/kg) GHG tax ($20/ton)  
GRN 0.17 -1.11 -0.95 
OCP 0.20 -0.94 -0.76 
OFD 0.08 0.01 0.08 
ROG 0.01 0.01 0.02 
OEG -2.35 0.02 -2.34 
FUE -2.33 0.02 -2.32 
CET 4.45 -2.58 1.71 
 
Table M2 % Change in Domestic Price with Potential Policies (Unit: %) 
 CO2 Tax ($20/ton) Fertilizer Tax ($0.12/kg) GHG tax ($20/ton)  
GRN 3.22 1.92 5.22 
OCP 2.94 0.49 3.45 
OFD 2.94 0.05 2.99 
ROG 3.02 0.01 3.02 
OEG 6.42 0.01 6.43 
FUE 6.04 0.01 6.05 
FER 3.59 3.12 6.81 
CET 5.67 0.92 6.62 
Labor 3.01 0.01 3.02 
Land 3.20 -1.70 1.43 
 
Table M3 % Change in Imports with Potential Policies (Unit: %) 
 CO2 Tax ($20/ton) Fertilizer Tax ($0.12/kg) GHG tax ($20/ton)  
GRN 0.62   2.24 2.88 
OCP -0.23   1.05 0.82 
OFD -0.22   0.09 -0.13 
ROG -0.09  -0.03 -0.12 
OEG 13.95  -0.06 13.88 
FUE 5.15   0.00 5.14 
FER 1.68   7.37 9.12 
CET 7.55  -1.08 6.86 
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Table M4 % Change in Exports with Potential Policies (Unit: %) 
 CO2 Tax ($20/ton) Fertilizer Tax ($0.12/kg) GHG tax ($20/ton)  
GRN -0.25 -2.68 -2.93 
OCP 0.51 -2.37 -1.89 
OFD 0.52 -0.14 0.38 
ROG 0.20  0.08 0.29 
OEG -50.91   0.36 -50.73 
FUE -11.60   0.03 -11.57 
FER -4.18 -22.12 -25.40 
 
Table M5 % Change of Environmental Variables and Utilities with Potential Policies (Unit: %) 
 CO2 Tax ($20/ton) Fertilizer Tax ($0.12/kg) GHG tax ($20/ton)  
GHG Emissions -1.04 -0.01 -1.06 
Nitrogen Use 0.04 -1.84 -1.81 
Utility -0.01 0.00 -0.05 
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APPENDIX N  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF σU FOR OPEN-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table N1 % Change in Domestic Production with Different σU 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 
GRN -0.92 -0.93 -0.95 -0.96 -0.98 -1.01 -1.04 
OCP -0.76 -0.76 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.74 
OFD 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.12 
ROG 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
OEG -2.14 -2.24 -2.34 -2.44 -2.64 -2.84 -3.14 
FUE -2.16 -2.24 -2.32 -2.40 -2.55 -2.71 -2.94 
CET 2.30 2.03 1.76 1.49 0.95 0.42 -0.37 
 
Table N2 % Change in Domestic Price with Different σU 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 
GRN 5.21 5.21 5.22 5.22 5.23 5.23 5.24 
OCP 3.44 3.44 3.45 3.45 3.46 3.46 3.47 
OFD 2.98 2.99 2.99 2.99 3.00 3.01 3.02 
ROG 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.03 3.03 3.04 3.05 
OEG 6.42 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.44 6.44 6.45 
FUE 6.05 6.05 6.05 6.06 6.06 6.07 6.07 
CET 6.62 6.62 6.62 6.63 6.63 6.64 6.65 
Labor 3.01 3.01 3.02 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.06 
Land 1.42 1.42 1.43 1.43 1.44 1.45 1.47 
 
Table N3 % Change in Imports with Different σU 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 
GRN 2.92 2.90 2.88 2.87 2.83 2.80 2.75 
OCP 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.87 
OFD -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 
ROG -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 
OEG 14.12 14.00 13.88 13.76 13.52 13.28 12.93 
FUE 5.32 5.23 5.14 5.05 4.87 4.70 4.44 
CET 6.96 6.68 6.39 6.11 5.55 4.99 4.17 
 
Table N4 % Change in Exports with Different σU 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 
GRN -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 -2.94 -2.94 -2.94 
OCP -1.88 -1.88 -1.89 -1.89 -1.90 -1.91 -1.92 
OFD 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 
ROG 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.23 
OEG -50.74 -50.73 -50.73 -50.73 -50.73 -50.73 -50.72 
FUE -11.57 -11.57 -11.57 -11.57 -11.57 -11.56 -11.56 
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Table N5 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different σU 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 
CO2 equivalent GHGs -0.87 -0.96 -1.06 -1.15 -1.34 -1.52 -1.80 
Nitrogen Use -1.80 -1.80 -1.81 -1.81 -1.82 -1.82 -1.83 
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APPENDIX O  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF σF FOR OPEN-ECONOMY MODEL 
Table O1 % Change in Domestic Production with Different σF 
 1 2 3 3.75 4 5 
GRN -1.00 -0.97 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 
OCP -0.74 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.76 -0.76 
OFD 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
ROG 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
OEG -2.33 -2.33 -2.34 -2.34 -2.34 -2.34 
FUE -2.20 -2.26 -2.30 -2.32 -2.33 -2.35 
CET -0.17 0.49 1.20 1.76 1.95 2.73 
 
Table O2 % Change in Domestic Price with Different σF 
 1 2 3 3.75 4 5 
GRN 5.21 5.21 5.22 5.22 5.22 5.22 
OCP 3.44 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45 
OFD 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 
ROG 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 
OEG 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 
FUE 6.05 6.05 6.05 6.05 6.05 6.05 
CET 6.62 6.62 6.62 6.62 6.62 6.62 
Labor 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 
Land 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 
 
Table O3 % Change in Imports with Different σF 
 1 2 3 3.75 4 5 
GRN 2.71 2.79 2.85 2.88 2.89 2.91 
OCP 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 
OFD -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
ROG -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 
OEG 13.87 13.87 13.88 13.88 13.88 13.88 
FUE 5.28 5.21 5.17 5.14 5.13 5.11 
CET 4.37 5.06 5.81 6.39 6.59 7.42 
 
Table O4 % Change in Exports with Different σF 
 1 2 3 3.75 4 5 
GRN -2.92 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 
OCP -1.86 -1.87 -1.88 -1.89 -1.89 -1.89 
OFD 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
ROG 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 
OEG -50.71 -50.72 -50.73 -50.73 -50.73 -50.74 
FUE -11.56 -11.57 -11.57 -11.57 -11.57 -11.57 
FER -2.92 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 
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Table O5 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different σF 
 1 2 3 3.75 4 5 
CO2 equivalent GHGs -1.00 -1.02 -1.04 -1.06 -1.06 -1.07 
Nitrogen Leaching -1.82 -1.81 -1.81 -1.81 -1.81 -1.81 
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APPENDIX P  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF CONVERSION FACTOR FOR OPEN-
ECONOMY MODEL 
Table P1 % Change in Domestic Production with Different N Conversion Factors 
CF 1.3% 2% 2.5% 3% 4% 5% 
GRN -0.95 -1.56 -1.99 -2.43 -3.31 -4.20 
OCP -0.75 -1.29 -1.68 -2.07 -2.88 -3.72 
OFD 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 
ROG 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
OEG -2.34 -2.33 -2.33 -2.32 -2.31 -2.30 
FUE -2.32 -2.31 -2.31 -2.30 -2.29 -2.28 
CET 1.76 0.28 -0.78 -1.85 -4.01 -6.19 
 
Table P2 % Change in Domestic Prices with Different N Conversion Factors  
CF 1.3% 2% 2.5% 3% 4% 5% 
GRN 5.22 6.34 7.16 8.00 9.73 11.52 
OCP 3.45 3.73 3.94 4.16 4.61 5.08 
OFD 2.99 3.02 3.04 3.06 3.11 3.16 
ROG 3.02 3.03 3.03 3.04 3.04 3.05 
OEG 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.44 6.44 6.45 
FUE 6.05 6.06 6.07 6.08 6.09 6.10 
CET 6.62 7.16 7.55 7.95 8.78 9.63 
Labor 3.02 3.02 3.03 3.03 3.03 3.04 
Land 1.43 0.47 -0.21 -0.89 -2.25 -3.61 
 
Table P3 % Change in Imports with Different N Conversion Factors  
CF 1.3% 2% 2.5% 3% 4% 5% 
GRN 2.88 4.16 5.09 6.05 8.03 10.08 
OCP 0.82 1.42 1.87 2.33 3.28 4.28 
OFD -0.13 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.08 0.17 
ROG -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.19 -0.21 
OEG 13.88 13.84 13.81 13.78 13.72 13.65 
FUE 5.14 5.14 5.13 5.13 5.13 5.13 
CET 6.39 5.75 5.28 4.81 3.84 2.86 
 
Table P4 % Change in Exports with Different N Conversion Factors  
CF 1.3% 2% 2.5% 3% 4% 5% 
GRN -2.93 -4.39 -5.43 -6.48 -8.57 -10.66 
OCP -1.89 -3.22 -4.19 -5.18 -7.18 -9.23 
OFD 0.38 0.30 0.24 0.18 0.04 -0.10 
ROG 0.29 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.54 
OEG -50.73 -50.63 -50.56 -50.49 -50.34 -50.19 
FUE -11.57 -11.55 -11.54 -11.53 -11.50 -11.48 
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Table P5 % Change of Environmental Variables with Different N Conversion Factors  
CF 1.3% 2% 2.5% 3% 4% 5% 
CO2 equivalent GHGs -1.06 -1.07 -1.09 -1.12 -1.18 -1.27 
Nitrogen Leaching -1.81 -2.79 -3.48 -4.17 -5.54 -6.87 
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APPENDIX Q  
CGE MODEL CODE 
*CGE OPEN ECONOMY 
$TITLE: AN OPEN CONOMY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR BIOFUEL 
SETS 
       U            SAM TABLE INPUT                 /GRN, OCP, OFD, ROG, OIL, OEG, FUE, FER, STH, MET, SWI, 
MIS, CET,  CAP, LAB, LAD, TAX, TM, HOH, INV, SAV, IM, EXT, PR/ 
       ALTF(U)  FEEDSTOCK FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY    /SWI, MIS/ 
       ALT(U)     NEW TECHNOLOGY                  /STH, MET/ 
       I(U)           COMMODITY                              /GRN, OCP, OFD, ROG, OIL, OEG, FUE, FER, CET/ 
       HH(U)       FINAL DEMAND ENTITY          /HOH, INV/ 
       FO(I)         FOOD                                             /GRN, OCP, OFD/ 
       H(U)         FACTORS                                       /CAP, LAB, LAD/ 
       HE(H)       FACTORS EXCEPT CAPITAL     /LAB, LAD/ 
       CE(I)        ENERGY INPUT                             /FUE, OIL,OEG/ 
       IN(I)         OTHER INTERMEDIATE INPUTS       /GRN, OCP, OFD, ROG/; 
 
ALIAS (U,V), (I,J), (IN1,IN), (ALTF, ALTF1); 
 
TABLE SAM(U,V)  SAM 
 GRN OCP OFD ROG OIL OEG FUE FER CET 
GRN 155 0 12143 1418 0 2 0 0 2934 
OCP 192 3334 33712 19350 38 37 4 0 4 
OFD 34 104 214840 151476 12 36 72 15 6 
ROG 11025 43943 243012 7515916 15599 122309 20651 3841 790 
OIL 0 0 0 0 4 23 204517 8 0 
OEG 2 62 8903 220183 2641 85041 26074 0 923 
FUE 909 2936 2472 176180 0 14073 27668 251 0 
FER 2396 4153 0 0 0 0 0 1066 0 
CET 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LAD 4002 21104 8575 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LAB 4698 25092 123349 6629062 8018 49866 2511 749 219 
CAP 4685 25524 90670 2601646 39548 152109 3911 180 2608 
TAX -3988 -8538 19510 1590027 5798 32212 8289 42 -1735 
HOH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IMP 459 17140 54289 1395705 132749 17907 36132 2243 252 
TM 0 550 2630 20732 295 0 489 0 0 
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 LAD LAB CAP TAX HOH INV EXT TM PR 
GRN 0 0 0 0 308 1 7608 0 19020 
OCP 0 0 0 0 49427 5 29303 0 8880 
OFD 0 0 0 0 412568 64 34878 0 9965 
ROG 0 0 0 0 9168182 2183093 993334 0 211348 
OIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 0 16 
OEG 0 0 0 0 123737 0 6046 0 299 
FUE 0 0 0 0 89004 0 16825 0 6009 
FER 0 0 0 0 0 0 780 0 166 
CET 0 0 0 0 6002 0 0 0 0 
LAD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LAB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CAP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TAX 0 0 0 0 193654 15290 0 0 0 
HOH 33682 6843563 1875360 1850561 0 0 0 24695 0 
SAV 0 0 1045522 0 584979 0 567952 0 0 
IMP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
TABLE NEWF(U,ALTF)    THE INPUT REQUIRED TO PRODUCE ALTERNATIVE FEEDSTOCK 
                         SWI              MIS   
ROG          963.95435        541.66697 
FUE          493.39952        314.36686 
FER          495.65605        104.55192 
SWI          179.51878            0.00000 
MIS              0.00000        629.41698 
LAD       2092.79717      1000.06087 
LAB          880.66805        690.74648 
CAP          421.81247        330.84597; 
 
TABLE NEW(U,ALT)   THE INPUT REQUIRED TO PRODUCE THE SAME QUANTITY OF BASELINE 
ETHANOL (CET) 
                          STH                MET 
ROG         2480.66185          2523.70672 
FUE            263.89437            263.89437 
OEG          -156.45239           -156.45239 
SWI           5527.80639                0.00000 
MIS                  0.00000          3611.65605 
LAB           1434.82907          1391.78420 
CAP            1332.34128          1292.37105 
; 
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PARAMETER C(J) CO2 EMISSIONS IN 2004 (UNIT: TONNES) 
/FUE             2452204300 
 OEG             3616927100 
 OIL                      411500 
/; 
 
PARAMETER       Y0(J)    COMPOSITE FACTOR OR  VALUE ADDED 
                F0(H,J)         THE H-TH FACTOR INPUT BY THE J-TH FIRM 
                X0(I,J)         INTERMEDIATE INPUT (I-TH INPUT IN J-TH FIRM) 
                Z0(J)           OUTPUT OF THE J-TH GOOD 
                XP0(I)         HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION OF THE I-TH GOOD 
                IM0(J)         IMPORT 
                E0(J)            EXPORT 
                YB0(J)         DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF THE J-TH GOOD 
                INC0            INITAL INCOME 
                COMP0       TOTAL CONSUMPTION 
                N0(J)            NITROGEN RUNOFF VALUE 
                D0(I)            DOMESTIC DEMAND 
                CEP0(J)       CAPITAL-ENERGY INPUT 
                FUEU0        TOTAL FUEL DEMAND 
                FOOD          FOOD DEMAND 
                SAV0           CONSUMER SAVINGS 
                INV0(I)        INVESTMENT DEMAND 
                FS0               FOREIGN SAVINGS 
                FF(H)            FACTOR ENDOWMENT 
                DEP0(H)       DEPRECIATION 
                RP(I)             RENT FOR THE EXPORT DEMAND FUNCTION 
 
                XALT0(U,ALT)    INTERMEDIATE INPUT FOR ALTERNATIVE NEW PRODUCTION 
                YALT0(ALT)      COMPOSITE FACTOR OR  VALUE ADDED 
                FALT0(H,ALT)    THE H-TH FACTOR INPUT BY THE J-TH FIRM 
                ZALT0(ALT)      OUTPUT OF THE J-TH GOOD 
                XALTF0(U,ALTF)  INTERMEDIATE INPUT FOR ALTERNATIVE NEW PRODUCTION 
FEEDSTOCK 
                YALTF0(ALTF)    COMPOSITE FACTOR OR  VALUE ADDED FOR NEW FEEDSTOCK 
                FALTF0(H,ALTF)  THE H-TH FACTOR INPUT BY THE J-TH FIRM  FOR NEW FEEDSTOCK 
                ZALTF0(ALTF)    OUTPUT OF THE J-TH GOOD  FOR NEW FEEDSTOCK 
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                CEPALT0(ALT)    CAPITAL-ENERGY INPUT 
                CEPALTF0(ALTF)  CAPITAL-ENERGY INPUT 
 
                TAX0(J)         INDIRECT TAX 
                TAXH0(HH)       TAX FOR FINAL DEMAND 
                TR0(J)          INDIRECT TAX RATE 
                TM0(J)          IMPORT TAX 
                TMR(J)          IMPORT TAX RATE 
                TRH0(HH)        TAX RATE FOR FINAL DEMAND 
 
                DCK(J)          MARKET CLEARING CHECK 
                BUDCK           BUDGET CHECK 
                FACK(H)         FACTOR CLEARING CHECK 
                INVCK           INVESTMENT CHECK 
; 
 
*SUPPLY SIDE 
*INTERMEDIATE INPUT I IN INDUSTRY J  (FUEL IS IN THE VALUE-ADDED PART, BUT FOR 
MODELING PURPOSE, THE INPUT DEMAND IS REPRESENTED AS X0) 
X0(I,J) =SAM(I,J); 
*FACTOR INPUTS 
F0(H,J) =SAM(H,J); 
*CAPITAL AND ENERGY INPUT 
CEP0(J)= F0('CAP',J)+X0('FUE',J)+X0('OEG',J)+X0('CET',J); 
 
*INTERMEDIATE INPUT I IN ALTERNATIVE INDUSTRY  (FUEL IS IN THE VALUE-ADDED PART, BUT 
FOR MODELING PURPOSE, THE INPUT DEMAND IS REPRESENTED AS X0) 
XALT0(U,ALT) =NEW(U,ALT); 
*FACTOR INPUTS 
FALT0(H,ALT) =NEW(H,ALT); 
*CAPITAL AND ENERGY INPUT 
CEPALT0(ALT)= FALT0('CAP',ALT)+XALT0('FUE',ALT)+XALT0('OEG',ALT)+XALT0('CET',ALT); 
*TOTAL VALUE 
ZALT0(ALT)=SUM(U,NEW(U,ALT)); 
 
*INTERMEDIATE INPUT I IN ALTERNATIVE FEEDSTOCK  (FUEL IS IN THE VALUE-ADDED PART, 
BUT FOR MODELING PURPOSE, THE INPUT DEMAND IS REPRESENTED AS X0) 
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XALTF0(U,ALTF) =NEWF(U,ALTF); 
*FACTOR INPUTS 
FALTF0(H,ALTF) =NEWF(H,ALTF); 
*CAPITAL AND ENERGY INPUT 
CEPALTF0(ALTF)= 
FALTF0('CAP',ALTF)+XALTF0('FUE',ALTF)+XALTF0('OEG',ALTF)+XALTF0('CET',ALTF); 
*TOTAL VALUE 
ZALTF0(ALTF)=SUM(U,NEWF(U,ALTF)); 
 
*DEMAND SIDE 
*HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 
XP0(I)  =SAM(I,"HOH"); 
*FUEL DEMAND 
FUEU0=XP0('CET')+XP0('FUE'); 
*FOOD DEMAND 
FOOD=SUM(FO,XP0(FO))+XP0("GRN"); 
 
*FINAL DEMAND TAX 
TAXH0(HH) = SAM('TAX',HH); 
 
*HOUSEHOLD TOTAL CONSUMPTION COST 
COMP0=SUM(I,XP0(I))+TAXH0('HOH'); 
 
*HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
INC0 = SUM(U, SAM('HOH',U)); 
*INVESTMENT DEMAND 
INV0(I)=SAM(I,'INV'); 
*HOUSEHOLD FACTOR ENDOWMENT 
FF(H)=SAM('HOH',H); 
 
*DEPRECIATION 
DEP0(H)=SAM('SAV',H); 
 
*SAVING 
SAV0=SAM('SAV','HOH'); 
*FOREIGN SAVINGS 
FS0=SAM('SAV','EXT'); 
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*TRADE 
E0(J) = SAM(J,"EXT"); 
IM0(J)=SAM("IM",J); 
 
*INDIRECT TAX FOR PRODUCTION 
TAX0(J) = SAM('TAX',J); 
 
*IMPORT TAX 
TM0(J)=SAM("TM",J); 
 
*TOTAL PRODUCTION QUANTITY 
Z0(J)= SUM(U, SAM(U,J)); 
 
*DOMESTIC SUPPLY 
YB0(J)=Z0(J)-IM0(J)-TM0(J)-E0(J); 
 
*INDIRECT TAX RATE 
TR0(J) = TAX0(J)/(Z0(J)-IM0(J)-TM0(J)); 
 
*IMPORT TAX RATE 
TMR(J)$IM0(J)=TM0(J)/IM0(J); 
 
*FINAL DEMAND TAX RATE 
TRH0('HOH')=TAXH0('HOH')/COMP0; 
TRH0('INV')=TAXH0('INV')/(SUM(J,INV0(J))+TAXH0('INV')); 
 
*RENT GENERATES FOR EXPORT DEMAND FUNCTION 
RP(I) = SAM(I, 'PR'); 
 
*DOMESTIC DEMAND 
D0(J)=SUM(I,X0(J,I))+XP0(J); 
 
*BALANCE CHECK 
DCK(J)=Z0(J)-E0(J)-D0(J)-INV0(J); 
BUDCK=INC0-SUM(I,XP0(I))-SAV0-TAXH0('HOH'); 
FACK(H)=SUM(J,F0(H,J))-FF(H)-DEP0(H); 
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DISPLAY DCK,BUDCK,FACK; 
 
PARAMETER CCOEF(J) CARBON COEFFICIENT  (TONS OF C PER DOLLAR OR UNIT OF OUTPUT) 
          NCOEF N2O CONVERSION FACTOR (TONS OF CO2 EQUIVALENT PER DOLLAR OF FERTILIZER) 
          PF   FERTILIZER INITIAL PRICE (DOLLAR PER KG) 
; 
PF = 0.25/0.45359237; 
CCOEF(J)= 1E-6*C(J)/D0(J); 
NCOEF= 1.3/100 * 44/28 * 298/1000/PF; 
 
PARAMETER  TF             FERTILIZER ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITY TAX 
          TALT(ALT)       CELLULOSIC ETHANOL TAX 
; 
TF = 0; 
TALT(ALT)=0; 
 
PARAMETER  TC BENCHMARK CARBON TAX ($ PER TON) /0.0/; 
 
PARAMETER        EIM(J)     ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN IMPORTS AND DOMESTIC 
PRODUCTION 
/GRN       1.3 
OCP        2.7 
OFD        2.4 
ROG        2.4 
OIL        5.2 
OEG        4.4 
FUE        2.1 
FER        3.3 
CET        2.1 
/; 
 
PARAMETER        EFE       ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN PETRO FUEL AND ETHANOL 
                 EF        ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AMONG ALL FOOD FOR CONSUMERS 
                 ECU       ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AMONG RIVAL GOODS ON THE UPPER LEVEL OF 
UTILITY ; 
EFE = 3.75; 
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EF=1; 
ECU=0.2; 
 
PARAMETER  EE(I)        ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN FUEL AND OTHER ENERGY 
/GRN       0.2 
OCP        0.2 
OFD        0.2 
ROG        0.2 
OIL        0.2 
OEG        0.2 
FUE        0.2 
FER        0.2 
CET        0.2 
/; 
 
PARAMETER  EEALT(ALT)        ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN FUEL AND OTHER 
ENERGY FOR ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY 
/STH        0.1 
MET         0.1 
/; 
 
PARAMETER  EEALTF(ALTF)        ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN FUEL AND OTHER 
ENERGY  FOR ALTERNATIVE FEEDSTOCK 
/SWI        0.1 
MIS         0.1 
/; 
 
PARAMETER ECE(I)     ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN CAPITAL AND ENERGY IN 
PRODUCTION OF J 
/GRN       0.1 
OCP        0.1 
OFD        0.1 
ROG        0.1 
OIL        0.1 
OEG        0.1 
FUE        0.1 
FER        0.1 
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CET        0.1 
/; 
 
PARAMETER ECEALT(ALT)     ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN CAPITAL AND ENERGY IN 
PRODUCTION OF ALT 
/STH       0.1 
MET        0.1 
/; 
 
PARAMETER ECEALTF(ALTF)     ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN CAPITAL AND ENERGY 
IN PRODUCTION OF ALTF 
/SWI       0.1 
MIS        0.1 
/; 
 
PARAMETER EFA(I)   ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AMONG FACTORS IN PRODUCTION OF J 
INCLUDING FERTILIZER 
/GRN       0.2 
OCP        0.3 
OFD        0.9 
ROG        1.3 
OIL        0.2 
OEG        0.3 
FUE        0.3 
FER        0.3 
CET        1.1 
/; 
 
PARAMETER EFAALT(ALT)   ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AMONG FACTORS IN PRODUCTION OF 
ALT INCLUDING FERTILIZER 
/STH       1.3 
MET        1.3 
/; 
 
PARAMETER EFAALTF(ALTF)   ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AMONG FACTORS IN PRODUCTION 
OF ALTF INCLUDING FERTILIZER 
/SWI       0.3 
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MIS        0.3 
/; 
 
PARAMETER EY(I)    ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AMONG UPPER LEVEL OF PRODUCITON 
PROCESS OF J: INTERMEDIATE AND VALUE ADDED 
/GRN       0 
OCP        0 
OFD        0 
ROG        0 
OIL        0 
OEG        0 
FUE        0 
FER        0 
CET        0 
/; 
 
PARAMETER EYALT(ALT)    ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AMONG UPPER LEVEL OF 
PRODUCITON PROCESS OF ALT: INTERMEDIATE AND VALUE ADDED 
/STH       0 
MET        0 
/; 
 
PARAMETER EYALTF(ALTF)    ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AMONG UPPER LEVEL OF 
PRODUCITON PROCESS OF ALTF: INTERMEDIATE AND VALUE ADDED 
/SWI        0 
 MIS        0 
/; 
 
$ONTEXT 
 
$MODEL:USA_CN 
 
$COMMODITIES: 
         P(I)            !       PRICE INDEX OF COMMODITIES 
         PA(I)           !       PRICE INDEX OF ARMINGTON AGGREGATION 
         PFX             !       PRICE INDEX OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
         W(HE)           !       PRICE INDEX OF FACOTRS 
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         PK              !       PRICE INDEX OF CAPITAL 
         PCEP(J)         !       CAPITAL-ENERGY PRICE INDEX 
         PC              !       CONSUMPTION PRICE INDEX 
         PSAV            !       INVESTMENT 
         PR(I)$E0(I)     !       RENT THAT GENERATES THE EXPORT DEMAND FUNCTION 
         PALTF(ALTF)     !       PRICE OF FEEDSTOCK 
         PCEPALT(ALT)    !     CAPITAL-ENERGY PRICE INDEX OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY 
         PCEPALTF(ALTF)  !       CAPITAL-ENERGY PRICE INDEX OF FEEDSTOCK 
 
$SECTORS: 
         A(J)            !       ARMINGTON AGGREGATION 
         Z(I)            !       TOTAL PRODUCTION INDEX 
         ZALT(ALT)       !       ALTERNATIVE PRODUCTION OF ETHANOL 
         ZALTF(ALTF)     !       PRODUCTION INDEX FOR ALTERNATIVE FEEDSTOCK 
         CEP(J)          !       CAPITAL-ENERGY DEMAND IN PRODUCTION J 
         CEPALT(ALT)     !       CAPITAL-ENERGY DEMAND IN PRODUCTION ALT 
         CEPALTF(ALTF)   !       CAPITAL-ENERGY DEMAND IN PRODUCTION ALTF 
         CW              !       CONSUMPTION 
         INVEST          !       AGGREGATE INVESTMENT 
         EXPORT(I)$E0(I) !       EXPORT 
 
$CONSUMERS: 
        RA               !       HOUSEHOLD INCOME (TOTAL) 
        FA               !       FOREIGN AGENT INCOME LEVEL 
 
 
$REPORT: 
        V:QA(I) O:PA(I)         PROD:A(I) 
        V:Q(I)  O:P(I)          PROD:Z(I) 
        V:QW(HE,I)  I:W(HE)     PROD:Z(I) 
        V:QK(I)  I:PK           PROD:CEP(I) 
        V:QFE(I) I:PA("FER")      PROD:Z(I) 
        V:QOIL(I)        I:PA("OIL")    PROD:Z(I) 
        V:QF(I)  I:PA("FUE")         PROD:CEP(I) 
        V:QOEG(I)   I:PA("OEG")      PROD:CEP(I) 
        V:QFALT  I:PA("FUE")         PROD:CEPALT 
        V:QOEGALT   I:PA("OEG")      PROD:CEPALT 
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        V:QFEALTF I:PA("FER")      PROD:ZALTF 
        V:QWALTF(HE,ALTF)  I:W(HE)         PROD:ZALTF(ALTF) 
 
        V:DNF      I:PA("ROG") PROD:CW 
        V:DOGU   I:PA("OEG")      PROD:CW 
        V:DFO(FO)         I:PA(FO) PROD:CW 
        V:DFUE    I:PA("FUE")   PROD:CW 
        V:DCET    I:PA("CET")   PROD:CW 
        V:DCOM        O:PC         PROD:CW 
        V:EXPO(I)           I:P(I)           PROD:EXPORT(I) 
        V:IMPO(I)             I:PFX           PROD:A(I) 
        V:QALT(ALT)     O:P("CET")    PROD:ZALT(ALT) 
 
 
$PROD:A(I)       S:EIM(I) 
         O:PA(I)         Q:(Z0(I)-E0(I)) 
         I:PFX           Q:IM0(I)        P:(1+TMR(I))     A:RA    T:TMR(I) 
         I:P(I)          Q:YB0(I) 
 
$PROD:Z(I) S:EY(I)   A:EFA(I) 
         O:P(I)  Q:(YB0(I)+E0(I))       P:(1-TR0(I))         A:RA    T:TR0(I) 
         I:PA(IN) Q:X0(IN,I) 
         I:PA("OIL")   Q:X0("OIL",I)   P:((1+CCOEF("OIL")*TC))    A:RA  T:(CCOEF("OIL")*TC) 
         I:W(HE) Q:F0(HE,I)  A: 
         I:PA("FER")    Q:X0("FER",I)  P:(1+TF)         A:RA    T:TF  A: 
         I:PCEP(I)       Q:CEP0(I)       A: 
 
$PROD:CEP(I)  S:ECE(I)  A: EE(I) 
         O:PCEP(I)       Q:CEP0(I) 
         I:PK   Q:F0("CAP",I) 
         I:PA("OEG")   Q:X0("OEG",I)  P:(1+CCOEF("OEG")*TC)    A:RA  T:(CCOEF("OEG")*TC)    A: 
         I:PA("FUE")$X0("FUE",I)    Q:X0("FUE",I)   P:(1+CCOEF("FUE")*TC)    A:RA  T:(CCOEF("FUE")*TC)      
A: 
 
$PROD:ZALT(ALT) S:EYALT(ALT)   A:EFAALT(ALT) 
         O:P("CET")  Q:(YB0("CET")+E0("CET"))         P:(1-TALT(ALT))         A:RA    T:TALT(ALT) 
         I:PA(IN) Q:XALT0(IN,ALT) 
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         I:PALTF(ALTF)   Q:XALT0(ALTF,ALT) 
         I:W(HE) Q:FALT0(HE,ALT)  A: 
         I:PA("FER")    Q:XALT0("FER",ALT)   P:(1+TF)         A:RA    T:TF   A: 
         I:PCEPALT(ALT)       Q:CEPALT0(ALT)       A: 
 
$PROD:CEPALT(ALT)  S:ECEALT(ALT)     A: EEALT(ALT) 
         O:PCEPALT(ALT)       Q:CEPALT0(ALT) 
         I:PK   Q:FALT0("CAP",ALT) 
         I:PA("OEG")   Q:XALT0("OEG",ALT)      P:(1+CCOEF("OEG")*TC)    A:RA  T:(CCOEF("OEG")*TC)            
A: 
         I:PA("FUE")$XALT0("FUE",ALT)    Q:XALT0("FUE",ALT)       P:(1+CCOEF("FUE")*TC)    A:RA  
T:(CCOEF("FUE")*TC)   A: 
 
$PROD:ZALTF(ALTF) S:EYALTF(ALTF)   A:EFAALTF(ALTF) 
         O:PALTF(ALTF)  Q:ZALTF0(ALTF) 
         I:PA(IN) Q:XALTF0(IN,ALTF) 
         I:PALTF(ALTF1)   Q:XALTF0(ALTF1,ALTF) 
         I:W(HE) Q:FALTF0(HE,ALTF)  A: 
         I:PA("FER")    Q:XALTF0("FER",ALTF)   P:(1+TF)         A:RA    T:TF   A: 
         I:PCEPALTF(ALTF)       Q:CEPALTF0(ALTF)       A: 
 
$PROD:CEPALTF(ALTF)  S:ECEALTF(ALTF)          A: EEALTF(ALTF) 
         O:PCEPALTF(ALTF)       Q:CEPALTF0(ALTF) 
         I:PK   Q:FALTF0("CAP",ALTF) 
         I:PA("OEG")   Q:XALTF0("OEG",ALTF)           P:(1+CCOEF("OEG")*TC)    A:RA  
T:(CCOEF("OEG")*TC)       A: 
         I:PA("FUE")$XALTF0("FUE",ALTF)    Q:XALTF0("FUE",ALTF)      P:(1+CCOEF("FUE")*TC)    A:RA  
T:(CCOEF("FUE")*TC)    A: 
 
$PROD:EXPORT(I)$E0(I)  S:1 
         O:PFX$E0(I)   Q:(E0(I)+RP(I)) 
         I:P(I)$E0(I)  Q:E0(I) 
         I:PR(I)$E0(I) Q:RP(I) 
 
$PROD:CW S:ECU     A: EF         B:EFE 
         O:PC    Q:COMP0          A:RA    T:TRH0("HOH") 
         I:PA("ROG") Q:XP0("ROG") 
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         I:PA("OEG")$XP0("OEG") Q:XP0("OEG")      P:(1+CCOEF("OEG")*TC)    A:RA  T:(CCOEF("OEG")*TC) 
         I:PA("OIL")$XP0("OIL") Q:XP0("OIL")      P:((1+CCOEF("OIL")*TC))    A:RA  T:(CCOEF("OIL")*TC) 
         I:PA("FER")$XP0("FER") Q:XP0("FER")     P:(1+TF)         A:RA    T:TF 
         I:PA(FO) Q:XP0(FO)        A: 
         I:PA("FUE")   Q:XP0("FUE")   P:(1+CCOEF("FUE")*TC)    A:RA  T:(CCOEF("FUE")*TC)    B: 
         I:PA("CET")      Q:XP0("CET")   B: 
 
$PROD:INVEST 
         O:PSAV          Q:(SUM(I,INV0(I))+TAXH0('INV'))      A:RA    T:TRH0("INV") 
         I:PA(I)$INV0(I)         Q: INV0(I) 
 
 
$DEMAND:RA 
         D:PC 
*FACTOR ENDOWMENT 
         E:W(HE)         Q:(FF(HE)+DEP0(HE)) 
         E:PK            Q:(FF("CAP")+DEP0("CAP")) 
 
*EMISSION TAX INCOME 
*         E:PCARB$CARBLIM         Q:CARBLIM R:CTAX$TC 
 
*FOREIGN SAVING 
         E:PFX          Q: FS0 
*INVESTMENT 
         E:PSAV          Q:(-SAV0-FS0-SUM(H,DEP0(H))) 
 
$DEMAND: FA 
         D:PFX   Q:(SUM(I,RP(I))) 
         E:PR(I)$E0(I) Q:RP(I) 
 
$OFFTEXT 
$SYSINCLUDE MPSGESET USA_CN 
OPTION MCP = PATH; 
 
PK.FX = 1; 
* FREE SOLVE 
USA_CN.ITERLIM = 80000; 
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$INCLUDE USA_CN.GEN 
SOLVE USA_CN USING MCP; 
DISPLAY Z.L, P.L; 
